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This thesis is a farther development of an inquiry
and round table discussion directed by Doctor l?>ederick A,
Cleveland from the chair of United States Citizenship on
the Maxwell Foundation in his seminar entitled "The Nation."
One of the outstanding topics brou<;^ht under consideration
by him was the need of a oroceduro for defining and ex-
pressing as well as for executing sovereign will in a nation
which has adooted a democratic form of government --the need
to develop a procedure for making its governing agents
responsive and responsible.
Obviously this is a subject of research that could not
be exhausted within the time available to a candidate for
the degree of ivlaster of Arts. In fact it is a subject to
which a life time of study miglit be devoted. Yet, the
significance of the method pursued stands out clearly in
this preliminary study of procedures developed to govern
the policy determining bodies and appeals to the elector-
ates in Great Britain and the United States of America. The
comparative results obtained challenge the attention of
thoughtful citizens.
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Doctor
P.A.Cleveland for his inwpiration and continued guidance
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through the Intricate paths of this theme. He Is also
grateful to Professor Ault for the latter 's many valuable
criticisms and suggestions.
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AMERICAN AND ENGLISH PhOCKDUhES FOK THE
DETEhlviI NATION AND EXPRESSION
OP SOVEREIGN WILL
INTRODUCTION
During the past decade democracy, democratic /^governments
and democratic institutions have been subjected to much dis-
paraginf^ criticism. Democratic government has been indicted
as being a fumbling, slow-moving, comoromising and inefficient)
government. Consequently, the orotagonists of those politi-
cal theories and institutions which are opposed to and con-
flicting with democratic political theories and institutions
have gone to great lengths when urging that the latter be
relegated to a position of relative disfavor in the minds of
those whose private opinion they assume constitutes the
Public Ooinion of the civilized countries of the world.
It is indeed platitudinous to assert that human falli-
bility has olaced the stamp of imperfection upon all human
creat ions--and that democracy and democratic institutions,
along with all other oolitical institutions, have not es-
caped this imprint. To allege, therefore, that democratic
institutions are perfect would certainly be a foolish state-
ment; on the other hand, however, to content ourselves with
the proDosition that perfection is beyond attainment, and
that to strive for it is a gesture which must inevitably
meet with failure, is to doom ourselves and our institutions

to decay. It Is Incumbent upon us, therefore, neither to
resign ourselves to the fttes nor to dedicate ourselves to
the preservation of the status quo, but rather to bend our
efforts and direct our enerp^ies to the improvement of our
democratic institutions. But before considering such insti-
tutions or discussing the problems of democratic govern-
ments, it will be well to errive at an understsnding of
what is meant by the term democracy.
In the eighteentn century, Montesquieu used the follow-
ing words to describe democracy: "When the body of people
in a republic are possessed of the supreme power, this is
called a democracy ....••.•In a democracy the people are in
some resoects the sovereign, and in others the subject.
There can be no exercise of sovereignty but by their suf-
frages which are their own will., The oeoole in
whom the supreme power resides ought to do of themselves
whatever conveniently they can; and what they themselves
cannot rightly perform, they must do by their ministers...."
In other words, by democracy is meant a politically organized
society in which sovereignty rests in that whole body of
people who constitute the nation, the members of which
undertake, one with another, to accept, for the purposes
of control, the deliberate judgment of the majority,
"institutionally, democracy means that the public agencies
of the politically organized society shall be controlled by
1. The Spirit of the Laws, Vol. I Book II Chapter II
-r
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the will of a majority of its members and conducted for
their benefit In the exercise of popular control
over the government democracy means the decision of every
question of public policy in accordance with the dictates
of social conscience; it moans that there must be a meet-
ing of the minds of not less than a majority nf the whole
society as determined by a olebiscite or reuresentat ive
body, or both, instead of the society being subject to the
dictates of a oersonftl sovereign or the consensus of the
minds of a minority as a dominant privileged class. It
means rule by the consensus of public opinion, including all
classes, arrived at after due deliberation; i.e., after
each question at issue has been clearly stated, the facts
supDorting the claims and contentions of all parties are
made known, and the arguments ol" the recognized leaders of
all oarties have been heard.
To operate successfully, democracy must needs give to
its oeople a full knowledge of the facts and conditions,
and the benefit of a full discussion and interpretation
thereof, before a consensus of ooinion is taken. It is
therefore, perhaps, unfortunate that only in very small
political societies can all the members, or all the voting
members, get together personally to participate in delibera-
tions which may result in the expression of an intelligent
2, The Budget and Responsible Governraent, Cleveland and
Buck, p. 6.
>i
group opinion. In our present complex civilization, politi-
cal societies have outgrown the possibility of personal
participation by the whole electorate; a representative body
exists to assist the electorate and to act for them on mat-
ters delegated to it, "Thus the representation principle
does not change the functions of the electorate; it only
changes the method of procedure whereby the electorate may
be informed. The whole voting membership still retains the
power of ultimate or supreme control."*^ Thus we are con-
fronted with a major problem presented by present-day dem-
ocratic institutions, to wit: In a huge democracy like ours
where all the people cannot meet face to face, (1) how are
the people to be made av/are of problems, and (2) how are
they to be made aware of the pertinent facts so that they
can exercise an intelligent choice? The solution to this
problem necessarily involves a consideration of procedure.
The assumption, on the basis of which this inquiry was
made, was that democracy has succeeded in so far as it has
amply provided for developing and expressing an informed
public opinion; democracy has failed in so far as it has not
adequately provided for clear definition of specific problems
to be solved or issues to be decided on the basis of conclu-
sions of fact instead of appeals to prejudice and the per-
sonal interests of the judges. The point of view from which
3. The Budget and Responsible Government, Cleveland and
Buck, p. 20.
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inquiry and discussion of the successes and failures of
democracy to retain the respect t.nd good will of modern
nations can with greatest advantage be observed, is one
that assumes for the governance of its uolitical courts
(its representative Dolicy-determining bodies) the same
need for a procedure adaoted to the dramatization of problems
and issues of social and oolitical Justice as obtains in
administrative and Judicial courts.
To the end that concreteness might be given to the
inquiry into the procedures of democracy's courts for the
trial of issues raised involving orinciples of social and
oolitical justice and consideration of needs for institu-
tional adjustment, the institutional requirements evolved
in resoonse to the pressures brought to obtain equal Justice
for all in judicial courts can be reduced to a formula with
nine successive steps.
1. A declaration, petition, complaint, information or
indictment which calls attention to an alleged breach or
threatened Imoairment of a substantive right or to a failure
to discharge a substantive duty by a designated party or
parties with an aooeal for remedial action to a duly consti-
tuted authority.
2. Official notification to the party or parties so
designated to appear and answer.
3. Appearance of the party or parties in court and a
definition of the oroblem by a joinder of issues.
1
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4. Prooaratlon for a hearing in ooen forum to adduce
testimony
.
5. An inquisitorial procedure in which the designated
authority seeks to prevent the introducing or insure the
eliminating of any and all testimony which is irrelevant to
the issues and Incomoetent as proof of the allegations
stated in his oleading by the moving party.
6. The weighing of the evidence for the purpose of
reaching a conclusion as to the proof or lack of proof of
the allegations.
7. A decision, as to wnat if any remedy shall be afford-
ed, is reached on the basis of existing law as aoDlied to
the state of facts discovered to exist.
8. The right of appeal to one or more higher tribunals
to review the decision.
9. The issuance of the judicial order to the executive
to enforce the final decision or Judgment.
The foregoing formula not only meets the requirements
of scientific inquiry but also provides the means of drama-
tizing every issue of sufficient importance to arouse public
interest when the whole inquest is conducted in open forum.
Accepting the foJti;o^.ng formula as scientifically sound and
adaptable, tne following categories may be set up as guides
for the collection of data descriptive of procedures of
political courts instituted by modern democratic nations.
1. Provisions made to enable interested individuals and

grouDs to bririR to tne attention of aporopriate authorities
questions of social justice and public policy,
2. Provisions made for defining the Issues with respect
to which evidence is to be taken.
3. Provisions made to ensure the appearance of all
parties who could give relevant and material testimony.
4. A fact-finding and reporting procedure wherein all
relevant testimony and evidence competent as proof of facts
pertinent to the question are gathered, and in which a con-
clusion as to the facts is reached.
5. A deliberative procedure in which the entire court
of first instance (tne representative body) determines what,
if any, decision or enactment shall be made on the basis
of social justice and public policy as applied to the state
of facts discovered to exist.
6. A procedure for review and revision.
7. The right of appeal to the electorate for final
approval or disapproval.
8. The execution of the final decision.
1) Why legislative procedures . Of the several organs
through which group-will is expressed and carried out, the
legislative organ occupies a paramount place because "the
will of the lawmaking power must from the very necessity of
the case be superior, to a certain extent, to those of the
executive rnd judicial organs, first because that will must
be expressed before it can be interpreted and enforced and,
second, because it belongs to the legislature to provide the
tf
i
aubordincte agencies throu/^h which the law is interpreted,
aoDlied and executed.
American and English legislative orocedurea have been
chosen because the United States and England are the two
great and leading exponents of political democracy against
which countries, perhaps, the greatest barrage of criticism
has been showered. It is my intention to present a factual
statement first of the American orocedure and then of the
English procedure so that the reader may form his own opin-
ion, by virtue of the elucidated contrasts, of the merits
and defects of the respective institutions which exist to
give effect to the will of the peoole in these two most out-
standing Dolitical democracies, to the end that the merits
of each may eventually supplant the defects of the other.
2 ) Nature and Function or the "legislative organ ,
"
Before continuing our consideration of procedures in these
legislatures, shall we cause a moment to reflect on the gen-
eral nature and func ion of a legislative body? professor
Garner describes the American Congress as an organ "analogous
to the board of directors of a corporation in that it aeter-
mines hov/ the government, and oarticularly the administrative
branch, shall be organized, what services it shall undertake,
how they shall be performed, and the amount of money which
4. Political Science and Government, James W. Garner, p. 593.

shall be exoended for their maintenance," The legislature
is an organ lor the exuression of oublic opinion, the mem-
bers of whir): have, or ere supposed to have, mandates from
their constituents in regard to the important political
issues of the day.
It is a quite generally accepted principle that repre-
sentation in lower chambers should be based upon total popu-
lation rather than upon the number of voters. There are
important deviations from this rule; so Important, in fact,
do some consider these exceptions to the underlying prin-
ciple that constituencies of substantially equal population
shall be equally represented that Mill lamentated that exist-
ing democracies were not "governments of the whole people,
by the whole people, equally represented, but governments of
the whole people, by a mere majority of the people, exclu-
sively represented." This observation, critical in tone,
has been made by many well-informed observers. It seems to
challenge the soundness both of majority rule and propor-
tionate representation. Nevertheless, it remains a fact
that both principles are firmly adhered to as fundamental.
Both principles are written into the constitutions of modern
democracy and numerous procedural devices have been employed
to make them effective. Since the real import of the com-
ments of the several authors in their criticism of majority
5, Political Science and Government- James W. Garner, p,595«
6, idem, pp. 626-627.

rule is to make the democratic principles (of equality, of
trusteeshio, of making; the individual members of the nation
subservient to rules governing them all, etc.) ineffective,
their observations are not pertinent to the subject of pro-
cedures devised to define and express the will of the "popu-
lar" sovereign, ani may be dismissed without further consid-
erat ion
.

AMKRICAN PROChUURK FOR THE DEFINITION
AND EXPRESSION OF SOVEREICrN WILL
A. The Role of Public Opinion
Public opinion is a motive force in democracy. To be
a proner motive force, it must be really public and popular
government is based on the assumption of a public opinion of
that kind. "in order that it may be public a majority is
not enough, and unanimity is not required, but the opinion
must be such that while the minority may not share it, they
feel bound, by conviction, not be fear, to accept it; and
if democracy is complete the submission of the minority must
be given ungrudgintrly , " Further, public opinion should be
Q
opinion, not orejudice.
What is public ooinion? In what setting does it func-
tion? Walter Lippmann, in his book "Public Opinion" aptly
defined it when he said, "Those features of the world outside
which have to do with the behavior of other human beings, in
so far as that behavior crosses ours, is dependent upon us,
or is interesting to us, we call roughly public affairs.
The pictures inside the heads of these human beings, the
Dictures of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes,
and relationship, are their public opinions. Those pictures
which are acted upon by groups of people, or by individuals
7. Public Opinion and Popular Government, A.L.Lowell, p. 15,
8. ibid, pp. 16, 18, 21, 22, 24.
X -
acting in the name of groups, are Public Opinion with capi-
tal letters." Thus, the analyst or public opinion must
recognize a triangular relationship between the scene of
action, the huiaan picture of that scene, and the human re-»
sponse to that picture working itself out upon the scene of
action. He must recognize that conflicting individuals and
groups live in the same world, an environment of reality,
but that they thirJc and feel in dilferent worlds, environ-
ments of pseudo-reality, and that it is because their stimuli
or motivations are derived from these pseudo-environments
that conflicts result when seeking adjustments with reality.
It is a problem of democracy, therefore, to provide such
institutions, to create such processes, that the pictures
formed in the minds of the individuals shall be as nearly
alike as possible. It is democracy's task, in other words,
if it wishes to function smoothly, if it wishes to be justi-
fied, to provide procedures adequate for the formation of a
real and intelligent public opinion. It is a fundamental
assumption of democracy that "the will of the people shall
be the law of the land public opinion rules the
country. Our political oarties, city councils, state legis-
latures, and Concress exist for the sole puroose of enacting
into law the decisions of public opinion, "^^
9. Public Opinion^ Walter Lippmann—p, 29
.
10. Our Governmental Machine, Schuylei C. Wallace, pp. 3-20,
i1
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The Imoortance of public opinion thus manifests it-
self. In a sense it may be considered the inl'ormal counter-
part of the more formal concept of sovereign will. Thus
it becomes self-evident that there can be no true sovereign
will until there exists a real Public Opinion which can
bo detei'mircd and defined. We thus come squarely face to
face with the problems as to what procedures have been
instituted to create an informed Public Opinion and what
processes have been institutionalized to ascertain and
express the sovereign will. The logical conclusion is that
in democratic government Public Opinion and Sovereign
Will are inextricable.
1) Popular Control through the Jiilectorate , The
American government is a government of the people, in the
sense that the people are sovereign and have it in their
power, both legally and actually, to make the government
what they want it to be and cause it, at least eventually,,
to do what they want it to do.-^-^ "Where a representative
body is interposed for purposes of inquest and discussion,
it serves as a court of first instance, the electorate
being a court of last resort. Whether the practice coin-
cides with the theory depends on the procedure developed
11. Introduction to American Government, Ogg and Ray,
p. 181.

and used (1) in the conduct of the deliberations of the
representative body; (2) provision made for giving pub-
licity to its inquiries and discussions; (3) the oopor-
tunity given to the leaders for appeal to the electorate;
and (4) the methods employed for the conduct of the appeal
to the oeople."-^^ These procedures are essential because
they are the processes by which "the motor centers of the
body politic" are brought under the domination of the
will of the people. They are the only processes by which
popular sovereignty can be made real.
By the term"electorate " we mean, of course, those
persons who are entitled to vote. But how is the electorate
distinguished from the rest of "the people?" Before
stating some of the more frequent tests orescribed as
requisite to be qualified as an elector, it should be
noted that there is no single body of rules or laws which
is universal throughout the United States and by virtue
of the compliance with which one is thereby considered as
a qualified elector, even to vote for officers in the
federal c^overnment . To become a member of the electoral
body qualified to elect federal officers, one must comply
with the laws of the state in which he seeics to exercise
his suffrage; in other words, it is only because one com-
plies with a state *s requirements that he is permitted to
12, The Budget and Responsible Government, p. 21,
(
exercise his suffrage in federal matters. The only pro-
visions made by the federal p!;overnment are inhibitory
regulations against the several states forbidding the
denial of the right to vote because of race, color or sex.
As has already been stated, each state has its own
laws which qualify oersons to become members of its elec-
torate. Although the laws are not entirely uniform, most
states have adopted the same general principles, e.g., an
elector must be a United States citizen; must be domiciled
within the state--from six months to a year prior to the
primary elections {this requirement varies from state to
state); must be at least 21 years of age; some states
impose literacy tests; a few still keeo the property quali-
fication; personal registration laws are universally
invoked
.
When an individual has complied with the state's re-
quirements, he becomes a qualified elector and may vote.
The electorate is that organ of society which gives voice
to the will of the people--the sovereign will. It is
a medium through which Public Opinion is expressed. Thus,
the people of the several states, by means of regulation
of suffrage qualifications within such states, control
the body of the electorate and, because of such control,
possess a means to express their will--the sovereign will.
II
"Voting is not merely a right. In a much truer sense
,
it is a duty. Nor is it a duty easy to perform properly,"
Voting, with all the details thereby involved, is a bare
minimum of what a democracy must ask of many of those upon
whom it has conferred the franchise it must secure from
them a variety of additional services based upon political
consciousness .^"^
Popular Control through the Party System . "Behind the
ballot box stand the political parties, channels for the
translation of public opinion into governmental action.
That, at least, is their avowed object. Only through the
presentation to the voters of a choice of issues can this
be accomplished."^^ The political parties do not stand aloof
from the general public. On the contrary, the oolitical
parties are composed of the oeople of the United States in
their tepacity as voters organized in more or less permanent
associations to the end that they may be more effective in
13, Political Parties and Electoral Problems, Brooks, p. 575.
14, The late President Hadley of Yale suggested four differ-
ent ways in which a voter might behave, e.g., (1) go
into politics as the business of life (2) influence pub-
lic affairs indirectly by activity in behalf of measures
calculated to promote better government (3) reserve
political activity for special emergencies (4) exert
general influence on the conduct of public affairs by
forming independently his moral judgment and expressing
it fearlessly. cf-Standards of Public Morality,
A.T. Hadley, (The Macmillan Company, 1907)
15, Our Governmental Machine, Wallace, pp. 30-40.
1...
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their action. These are the associations which nominate
candidates and "through which the ordinary citizen can exert
a direct influence in the formulation of public policy and
the execution of that policy when enacted into law "
The role which parties may play in clarifying and sim-
plifying current issues has been exalted by such authorities
as Woodrow Wilson and A. L. Lowell. In "Congressional Gov-
ernment ," ^Ivi Is on stresses the need for a party to act as a
"distinct organization under easily recognized leaders,"
President Emeritus Lowell indicates that, since any number
of points of view may arise with reference to a given issue,
it is the function of each pj.rty to make a definite align-
ment, presenting two more or less antagonistic solutions of
a problem. "it is necessary to formulate a 'yes' or 'no'
18
alternative for the voters." However, in many districts,
the judgment of the voters is so clouded by hereditary pre-
judice, by race antagonism, by rivalry between country and
city or by the personalit lo3 of local leaders that there is
no free choice between parties. In some districts oarty
loyalty has become a habit. Voters may, it is true, per-
sistently support one of the parties because they approve its
basic principles; but most unchanging districts have come to
follow a voting label for traditional reasons, irrespective
of merits or demerits of the party in a given campaign,
16. Introduction to American Government, Ogg and Ray, p.200,
17. 2nd edition, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1885.
18. Party Government in the House of Representatives ,Hasbrouck
> 16B
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Insofar as such conditions exist, they impair the theory
that strict party i^overnment is the most responsive to the
popular will.-'-^ Frank Kent, in his "The Great Game of
Politics," has suggested that in these unchanging "solid
districts" the true expression of popular will may never
occur because the decision of the dominant party is made
during the contest between party candidates in the party
primaries. The majority there prevailing is not always a
majority of the electorate participating in the regular
elections. The constitutional method of electing Senators
by "classes," i.e., a third every two years, prevents a
party majority of that body from being returned at any one
time. As a matter of fact, the six year term was intended
to remove tin individual Senator from too frequent or too
close contact with put.lic ooinion. On the other hand, the
entire House is renewed biennially. Its members are all,
in theory at least, elected upon the issues of the same
campaign, A political majority in the House is usually an
approximate, but by no means an unimpeachable, measure of
the nation's approval.
Party platforms, amongst other things, contain the
philosophy, aims and promises of the party, should it re-
ceive the endorsement of the people. Party candidates are
expected to adhere to the platform. Under the direct sys-
tem of nominating candidates, "platforms have become more
19. ibid, pD. 166-187
20. U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec, 3.
•t
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binding by makinp; them oeraonal rather than party pledges
This fact has been recognized by the parties, and no
party candidate is expected to adhere to any portion of th©
party's plafform if this would be in violation of the plat-
form on which he personally was elected. It is a recognition
of the orinciple of responsibility of officers to citizens.
The criticism aimed at the concentration of all power in
the House in the rulers of the majority party is well-exqlain^(a
and answered as follows: "By reducing the open business to
a form, by making all legislation pass through committees
•
the minority party and (equally important) the dissidents
among the majority are rendered helpless. All real business
is done in committees. There the minority members can do
what they will. Since they are always in a minority, it is,
in all but the rarest cases, impossible to get a bill out of
committee without the consent of the leader of the majority
party. This system is inevitable if the House is to be an
efficient agent of a party program...." The party pro-
gram is justified if it represents the sovereign will.
Popular Control through the Representatives , "it is be-
yond question that Parliament began as a matter of agency and
not of representation. Its members gathered as agents to
declare the will of their principals, not to consult about
the good of the whole. At what time they became representa-
tives rather than agents, deputies, delegates, nobody can say
21. Organized Democracy, F.A.Cleveland, pAge 376,
22. Government of the people, D.W. Brogan, p. 148.

20
with Drecia ion. It la a fact, however, that today there is
no unanimity of ooinion aa to the function of a representative
The universal use of this term cannot be taken to imoly a
common ap;reement as to the role of the representative. The
views expressed and the actual oractice of the several p;roups
acting in the matter may be classified under three general
heads
.
(1) The reoi'esentt t ive is regarded as the delegate or
agent of the constituency which elects him. It is hia
special duty to procure legislation for tne advancement of
the local interests of his constituency. This view waa
forcibly expreased by Henry J. Ford when he wrote, "The
proper business of representative institutions is to provide
*a place where every interest and shade of opinion in the
country can have its cause even passionately pleaded in the
face of the government, £.nd of all other interests and
opiniona.' "^^
(2) He may be regarded as the representat iv3 of the
whole state elected "to consult with other representatives
and charged primarily with the care and advancement of the
general interests "25 Edmund Burke, advocating thia
principle of repreaentat ion, argued that "a representative
is choser "by the people to think and act for them and that,
once chosen, he is a free and independent agent. "^^
23. Legislative principles, Robert Luce, p.434
24. Representative Government, p. 176. On p. 177 Ford asserts
that "the elective process can do no more than designate
peraons for the representative office."
£5. Political Science and Government , Garner ,pp .665-666.26. Documents ag^Re&dinga in Ani . Govt . ^Ma^th^ws-^&^^ rd nhi ,p ..-^pg.
i
(?) A representative may be viewed as "chosen merely
as a convenient mouthpiece of the people, and that he is
therefore subject to their will, so far as that can be de-
termined; "^7 or, as Garner out it, "he may be regarded as
the mouthpiece or spokesman of the political party which is
in the majority in the constituency from v/hich he is elected
end, es such, bound by the will of his party, whatever may
be his own personal views in regard to the expediency or
wisdom of particular legislative policies. \Vhen that will
has been clearly made known to him by resolutions or instruc-
tions, he is morally obliged to conform to it by his acts
and votes ,"^8
This latter view has probably had the widest acceptance
in the United States where "it was not unuaual for a stf-te
legislature, before the change to popular election, to in-
struct the Senators (and occasionally even the Representa-
tives) from that state how to vote on particular measures.
Such instructions may also be given expressly or impliedly
in party platforms and otherwise, although in every case
the difficulty of assuring respect for such instructions is
obvious. "29 Almost half the States include the right of
instruction in their declarations of the fundamental rights
27. Gf. Ivlote 26.
28. eg. Note 25
29. cf. Note 26

of citizens of a republic, It may be significant, too,
that the view thtt no instructions should be given has not
been specifically In id down in any of the American constitu-
tions.*^^ The arguments and assurance given to the wavering
delegates by Rufus King, when the Llasaachusetts Convention
met for the purpose of ratifying the Federal Constitution,
is of great significance. Explaining and defending it, he
declared: "The State Legislatures, if they find their dele-
gates erring, can and will instruct them. Will this be a
check? V/hen they hear the voice of the people solemnly dic-
tating to them their duty, they will be bold men indeed to
act contrary to it. These will not be instructiors sent them
in a private letter, which can be put in their pockets: they
will be public instructions, which all the country will see;
and they will be hardy men indeed to violate them."^^ The
Federal Constitution, in Massachusetts, was ratified by a
very close vote, "and had the vote gone against ratification
it is doubtful if any such Union as we now have woula have
been formed. It might, therefore, be alleged with some
ground that one of the promises which made the Union possible
was the promise of Rufus King that the delegates of a state
30. Legislative Principles, Luce, p. 455, "it is fair to
attach almost as much significance to omission as to
insertion, and to conclude that a majority of the
States may not believe in the principle."
31. cf. Note 25.
32. Debates of Massachusetts Convention of 1788, p. 146,
1I
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33in the national Congress rale;ht be instructed." Thus the
view that the reoresentat ive ' s function is not to interpret
the common good as his conscience, his study and his better
Judgment dictate "but to ascertain to the best of his ability
what public ooinion demands and give effect to it, whether
his conscience and Judgment aporove it or not,"^^^ is founded
on good evidence. Accordingly, "provision must be made by
the representative body for giving publicity to its inquests
and deliberations, for this is the only way that a large
and widely scattered electorate may become informed,,
The proceedings of the representative body, therefore, must
be so staged and so conduDt^r £s to make news. This means
that the proceedings of inquest and deliberation of the
representation must be cojiducted as a public forum in order
that the whole people may "listen in." This means that
every issue must be dramat ized . ""^^
A final word about the electrorate and the representa-
tives. Pledges are often elicited from the latter, A
33. Legislative Principles, Luce, p, 460.
34. political Science and Govt,, Garner, p. 675, cf. also
Constitutional Conventions, R.S,Hoar, p,186, "The
position of a delegate (in a constitutional convention
is ) a position of public trust, and even a public
office; but not, if we regard such conventions as
extraconst itut ional, a position under the constitu-
tion,"
35. Budget and Responsible Government, pp. 22-23
1* f
Dledge may bo ourely voluntary, i.e., an independent
declaration of purpose, or it may be given in response to
demand, i.e., quid pro quo. In either event, pledges are
akin to instructions, "They differ, of course, in that
a pledge is a promise and an instruction is a command,
so that normally they proceed from opposite parties—the
elector instructs, the elected oledges."^^ When a pledge
is made, all agree that the elected representative is
bound to carry out to the best of his ability the terms of
such pledge. But should the fundamental circumstances
change, is he released from his pledge without an ex-
pression of will from his constituency? This dilemma faces
every representative of the people for he has no way of
really ascertaining true public opinion until the electorate
speaks once again--and that time, generally, does not
come until after his opportunity for expressing the sovereign
will of his constituency has passed.
Censure is a method of punishing representatives whose
constituents view the relationship as one of master and
servant. At the behest of a design^cted number of the elec-
torate in a constituency, the legislature may pass a reso-
lution of censure: the legislature may subsequently rescind
36. Legislative Principles, p. 483.

such resolution, "Fortunately it is rarely bestowed by I'or-
mal action, for it is the most ineffective and useless form
of influence that can be exerted. The mischief, if mischief
it be, has been done li rarely can be undone. Censure
humiliates, embitters. Par better it is to ounish by the
37
accustomed method of defeat for reelection."
2) Control by Electorate . "The right of petition ,-^oes
back beyond history. Subjects have oetitioned rulers eyer
38
since there were subjects end rulers " From the be-
ginning of representative government, citizens have exercised
the right of oetitioninp; their legislature for the redress
of grievances. This right is recognized and well established
The very first article of the Bill of Rights in the United
States Constitution provides that Congress shall make no
law abridging the right of the people "to petition the gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances." A fortiori is such
right possessed by the electorate, "This right is closely
associated with a number of other rights, such as freedom of
39
assembly, free speech and free press...." Today private
bills constitute a great part of the work of both Knglish
and American legislatures .'^O
37. ibid, 0.486,
38. Legislative Principles, Luce, d.514,
o9 . Organized Democracy, P.A.Cleveland, p. 378.
40. Political parties and Electoral Problems, Brooks, p. 519.
In 1917, the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention pro-
vided that "By a yea-and-nay vote the legislature may sub-
mit to the people a substitute for any measure introduced
by initiative petition.

One of the chief problems of democrfitic nations is to
devise procedures whereby the national will shall be most
4
1
fully exoressed and most quickly determined, A direct method
for impressing the will of the electorate is the rif!;ht or
privilege granted to citizens to appear before legislative
bodies at public hearings on questions of policy, before tlia
final vote la taken. "This is a privilege granted either
II 42by statute or legislative rule " In some instances this
right is guaranteed by "constitutional provisions requiring
that the sessions must be open to the public, except when
occasions arise which in tJie opinion of the house require
)i 43secrecy
.
The initiative and referendum are devices for the making
of laws by mass vote. As a means lor exoressing popular
will, the initiative is a more direct method and a better
control over legislation than the referendum, "The initiative
as it has been generally adopted in the United States is a
device by which a soecified number of people (varying from
5 to 8 Per cent) may frame a statute and, by petition, sub-
mit it to the voters of the state for their rejection or
44
approval. If approved it becomes a law." The initiative
may travel its course without including the legislature or,
41. Robert Luce (Legislative Principles, p. 550) explains that
"the obvious weakness of government by opinion is the diffi-
culty of ascertaining it,"
42. Organized Democracy, P. A .Cleveland,
43. Federal and State Constitutions, Stimson, d.238.
44. Popular Government, A.B.Hall, p. 122,

by requirin^^ some degree of action on the part of that body,
may be indirect. In every case, however, the initiative must
start out with a net it ion. In Massachusetts, for example,
initiative net it ions must first go to the legislatuie which.
In turn, refers them to a committee. "Hearings, open to all
oarties, must then be held, after which the committee must
draft recommendations, with majority and minority reports,
AC
and submit them to the legislatiui^e . " The referendum, on the
other hand, is a device by which the electorate may veto a
measure passed by the legislature. The referendum is nega-
tive while the initiative is constructive. The referendum
has long been used without the initiative, notably in the
case of the requirement for the submission of constitutional
amendments .^'''"The referendum may be optional with the people,
being invoked only in case a certain per cent of the people
petition for it, or it may be optional with the legislature,
the reference to the people being left to their discretion,
or it mav be compulsory, the constitution providing that
every law or every law of certain classes shall not become
48
effective until approved by the people in a referendum."
Thus, by the referenda a bill which has already received the
approval of the legislative body may be overthrown by the
45. Massachusetts requires 20,000 signatures, and if the leg-
islature refuses to act favorably upon the petition, there is
the requirement of an additional 5000 signatures to force its
submission to the electorate. Thus the initiative might not go
beyonc^. what would in effect be a mass petition to the legislatikr
46. c£ Note 40
47. U.S. Constitution, Article V
^ ^ ^
Aft, r.r Nntg44; Le^4a4at^e Pr infijLolP^^ e « p. 574.
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DODular vote, while the initiative is essentially a device
whereby the electorate may enact legislation against the
will of the legislature. It should be clear, therefore,
that the initiative and referendum are independent and separ
ate of each other even though the common practice is to use
! one in conjunction with the other,
I
I
„
"Members of the legislature are fortified in their posi
tlcn for the entire time they are elected save that they may
be expelled by their own house. If, therefore, legislators
were derelict in their duties, they could not be foriSed to
perform them, for a member could not be mandamused
Not until the peoole undertook to exercise their powers of
sovereignty through tho recall was there any provision in
the fundamental law for reaching the legislature which re-
49fused to do Its duty," The recall has been well-defined
as "neither more nor less than a special election to deter-
mine whether an official shall be superceded before the
50
ordinary expiration of his term." As such, its field of
operation is completely different from that of direct legis-
lation. The recall uses petitions in much the same v;ay as
I
1 .
they are used in itiitiative and referendum procedures. It
i
(
I
was advocated as a means of increasing popular control over
i
I
government. Recall laws usually guarantee a period of grace
i
to officials subject to their provisions after which peti-
I
I tions may be circulated which must state briefly the reasons
49. Organized Democracy, F,A .Cleveland, pp,580-381.
50. Political Parties and Electoral Problems, p. 525.

upon which the demand for recall is based. To be effective,
the qetition must be signed by a certain percentap;© of the
voters of the state or district represented by the official
under fire. Candidates who wish to run against the incum-
bent are thereupon nominated by petition or in such other
manner as the primary laws may provide. The recall has
never been provided for by any constitutional amendment.
The I. H, and R. are devices for expressing sovereign
will by the electorate. The initiative and referendum
concern the expression of such will on matters airectly
relating to particular legislation. The recall is a de-
vice for expressing sovereign will on the question of
whether or not some individual representative or official be
recalled from office because of some definitely alleged
commissions or omissions. These institutional procedures
are especially commendable because they permit the sovereign
will to be determined and expressed on definite issues;
they allow such particular control by the electorate on
designated matters as is practically Impossible to achieve
through the ordinary channels of legislation. That, in
fact, is the reason why these procedures have become insti-
tutionalized, to a greater or lesser degree, in the United
States, '•t is not unlikely that the I. R. and H, more
nearly reflect and express real sovereign will than does
that "legal sovereign"--Congress
.
li
'I
B. Congress as an Organ for the Definition
and Expression of Sovereign Will
Since Congress was created as only one of three coordi-
nated branches of government, unlike the English Parliament,
it is the custodian of only limited and enumerated oowers
•
"Congress is indeed the legislative branch, but it does a
great deal more than merely make laws Congress is a
bicameral legislature. This setup produces deadlocks, de-
lays and division of responsibility; it also tends to a more
stable political system, to curb legislation by impulse and
to a greater consideration of proposed measures,
1) The House of Representatives was intended to be an
organ of government directly reuresenting the general body
•of the people. "Accordingly, the constitution orovides that
the members shall be elected 'by the people of the several
states ' No uniform national suffrage system has ever
been set up here, either by the constitution or by law. The
constitution requires only that for purposes of congressional
elections 'the electors in each state shall have the quali-
fications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch
of the state legislature.'"^^
"Representation ia one house is on the basis of ninnbers
and in the other on the basis of states the members of
51. Introduction to American Government, Ogg and Ray, p. 403.
52, ibid, pp .404-405; U.S .Constitution, Art icle I, Sec. 2, CI. 1.

both houses draw their mandate directly from the same source.
The Constitution requires Conjz;res9 to make an apportionment
of Representatives every ten years /^^^ Representation in the
lower house of Congress, therefore, is a legislative matter
determined by statute and apportioned according to popula-
tion.
The Constitution not only stipulates general qualifica-
tions for membership in the House of Representatives but,
in addition, it makes each house "the judge of the qualifica-
tions, elections, and returns of its own members." This
gives to each house the power (1) to settle contests (2) to
refuse to seat, (Z) to declare a seat vacant .^"^ An illus-
trative ca?"^ was bnat of Victor Berger, a fiery Milwaukee
Socialist, who was elected to represent the fifth district
of V,'isconsin in the House of Representatives. ^JVhen he pre-
sented his credentials as a member-elect to the 66th Con-
gress, the House, on November 10, 1919, by resolution, de-
clared him, on account of his actions during the war, in-
capable of taking the oath of office, Berger had previously
been convicted for opposing war and violating the Espionage
Act. ThereuDon, the House declared the seat vacant. In a
53, ibid, p,421.
54, U.S .Constitution, Article I, Section 2.
55, Documentary Source Book in American Government and Polit-
ics, Ewing and Dangerfield, Chapter XVII, Section I.
56, ibid, D. 312,
57, Documents and Readings in American Government, Mathews
and Berdahl, p, 296,
if
special election, Berp;er was a^2;ain elected. The House, by
the Resolution of January 10, 1920 declared him unqualified,
disallov/inp; the claim of his opponent to election, and again
declared the seat vacant. Because of the loyalty of his
constituents, the House's refusals to seat Berger amounted
to a denial of representation to this Wisconsin district.
Being again elected at the regular election of 1922, and
his conviction having in the meantime been reversed by the
Supreme Court, he was seated in the House. Berger was later
elected to the 68th, 69th and 70th Congresses and served
witho t further disqualification.
Under the terms of the Constitution, Congress meets at
least once a year--cn the first Monday in December, unless
it should choose to fix a differ at date. This gives each
Congress two regular sessions. A newly chosen House of
heoresentatives is called to order end presided over by the
clerk of the oreceding House until a speaker is elected.
He calls the roll of members by states, in alphabetical
order; upon this roll are the names of all members-elect
whose certificates of election have been forwarded to the
Clerk by the prooer officials in the various states. If the
right to a seat is contested, the matter is referred for
investigation and report to one of three standing committees
on election, after the House has fully organized. After the
58. ibid: cf reference in Note 55, at pages 314-515.
59. Introduction to American Govt., Ogg and Ray, p. 429,
•c
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roll-call, the oath of office is administered to all the
members in a body (except, of course, those whose qualifica-
tio..£: were challenged), 'i'he first important step in the
formal organization of the House is the election of the
regular presiding officer, i.e., the speaker; then a clerk
is chosen, While the constitution orovides that these
officials shall be elected by the House, what really occurs
is that the House merely ratifies a slate previously agreed
upon by a caucus of the majority members, None of these
officials, not even the Speaker, needs to be a member of the
House; usually, only the Speaker ever is a inexiiber, "After
these elections, it is customary for one of the older mem-
bers of the majority party to move the adoption of the rules
of the preceding Congress, If, as is usually the case, any
members feel that the rules ought to be changed, this is the
time for them to propose alterations; for, once the old rules
\
are retidopted without change, it is invariably found next to
impossible to bring about reforms in procedure, however
desirable they may be as a means of making the House a more
effective instrument of democratic government The old
rules having been readopted, all further proposals for
change are automatically referred to the committee on rules--
a body regularly dominated by tried leaders of what is common-
ly called the House "machine," and even more hostile to
innovation than the average run of members .... It is theoreti-
60. Also a sergeant-at-arms , a doorkeeper, a post master and
a chaplain.
ir
c
CQlly posulble, but usually exceedingly difficult to compel
the committee on rule3--or any other coinmittee--to report
on a matter referred to it, if the committee is itself un-
favorable to the orooosal Therefore, the time to accom-
plish reforms, if any are desired, is at the very opening
of the first session of a new Congress."
Let us now turn to a consideration of the powers and
prerogatives of the Speaker of the House. He not only outs
questions and announces votes, but decides the multifarious
questions of parliamentary law that arise during every
session. The Important power of recognition is also his and
he considers hiinself under no obligation, as does the Eng-
lish speaker, to wield it imoartially. In describing this
function Mssrs
. Ogg and Ray have this to say: "Unless for-
mally recognized by the speaker, no member can obtain the
ear of the House To be sure, he is bound to follow the
rules of the House; and the rules give a certain precedence
to some committees or to their chairmen, and certain days
are set apart for special classes of business. But, with
all due allowances for such limitations, the speaker still
has much leeway for exercising his own discretion in grant-
ing the floor to members. The speaker also appoints select
and conference committees from time to time, but he no longer
possesses the prerogative of appointing all committees, as
he could formerly."
61. cf reference in Note 59.
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The coiaaittee system in the American Congress is per-
haps the most important part of the formal legislative struc-
ture. " the DOwer of the committees is so great that
it has frequently been stated that the real legislation is
accomplished by them. They can kill a bill, amend, revise
or rewrite It in any way or even introduce an entirely new
bill. Bills go to committee before any discussion has taken
place on them "^^ It is only natural that committees
have much power. "it would be out of the question for the
Senate or House to oass judgment forthwith on each of the
thousands of oroposals presented. Hence the resort to
committees. They are denounced. They are dubbed 'little
legislatures.'"^*^ Nevertheless, an elaborate committee system
Is nowhere more indispensable than In the American House. ^'^
At the beginning of each Congress, the entire House member-
ship Is divided into small group3--standlng comiiilttees--each
to receive, examine and "pigeon-hole" or report on measures
of a given type referred to it during the ensuing two years
and in some cases also to take the initiative in framing
bills. These standing committees are elected, Select
62, Encyc . Social Sciences, Vol. 4, p. 455.
63, Congress-On Explanation, Luce, p. 4,
64. Every biennlum the House is confronted with from 20,000
to 30,000 legislative proposals.
65. House Rule X. 1. There shall be elected by the House,
at the commencement of each Congress, the following
standing committees .., ,2 .The Speaker shall appoint all
select and conference committees which shall be ordered
by the House from time to time.... 4,All vacancies in
standing committees of the House shall be filled by
elec'^\on by the House,
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committees are appointed to deal with particular matters.
From time to time, conference committees are appointed to
confer with similar committees of the Senate on legislation
on which the two houses have been unable to agree. "It is
in Congress that the confeionce committee has developed its
worst aspects Their power lies chiefly in the fact that
reports of conference committees must be accepted without
amendment or else rejected in toto."
"in size. House committees range all the way from two
members up to thirty-five; twenty-one is the standard number.
Members rarely serve on more than three standing committees,
and the majority belong to only one. Under the present
practice, members placed on any one of the ten or more major
committees are never given any other standing committee
assignment. On every committee, both parties, and sometimes
third parties, are represented, in ratios varying according
to the distribution of party strength in the House from
Congress to Congress.
"From the earliestdays down to 1911, standing committees
were appointed by the speaker. Since that date, the House
itself has elected, at the beginning of each Congress, sub-
ject to the qualification that vi^at the body as a whole does
is to ratify lists prepared in advance and presented to it.
These committee lists are prepared by a committee on commit-
tees, subject to the approval of the majority and minority
66. Legislative Procedure, Luce, pp. 403-40 4,

caucuses. The majority members on this committee are elected
in the majority caucus at the opening of each new Congress:
the minority members of the committee are similarly chosen
in the minority caucus. The chairman and other majority
members of all the remaining committees are then selected by
the majority members on this "committee on committees," and
the minority members on each committee are in similar manner
named by the minority of the "committee on committees." Then
the action of these two groups, having first been approved
by the resoective party caucuses, is reported to the House,
cry
which oroceeds to the formal election."
2) The United States Senate . Representation in the
Senate Is on the basis of states and not of population.
"The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen Vby direct plurality vote of
the people, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one
Vote."^Q
Like the House of Representatives, the Senate is the
sole Judge of the qualifications of its own members.
Broadly resembling the House in form of organization,
the Senate differs in some important respects. Unlike the
House, which has to be reorganized from the ground up every
two years, the Senate, a third of whose members retire at
67. Intro, to American Govt., Ogg and Ray, pp. 429 ff.
68. U. S. Const itution. Article I, Section 3, Clause 1.
69. Documentary Source Book, Ewing and Dangerfield,
Chapter XVIII, p. 337.
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any fz;lven time, has a continuous existence and to a consider-
able extent a continuous organization. PJven though Senate
committees are reelected, with necessary changes of personel,
when a new Congress meets, its organization is regarded as
having been continuous since the Senate first met in 1789,
The Senate's presiding officer (termed the President)
is not chosen by the body over which he presides, but holds
such position by the terms of the Constitution.'''^ Therefore,
partisan and factional contests are avoided exceot when
necessary to fill the chair by the election of a president
71pro tempore.'"^ Presidency of the Senate carries with it
little of the power over parliamentary proceedings which is
associated with speakership in the House. He more nearly
represents the Lord Chancellor who presides over the Lords;
thus, he is a presiding officer or moderator, and nothing
more. He decides points of order subject to appeal by any
senator to the Senate itself.
DesDite the fact that the Senate is a smaller body than
the House, it has about as many officers and standing commit-
tees; extra-legal agencies of party authority are quite as
much in evidence. The party caucus, steering committee,
floor leader and whips do exist; but neither "conference"
nor steering committee wields the unshakable control that
70. Article I, Sec. 3, CI. 4 "The Vice President of the United
States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have
no Vote, unless they be equally divided."
71. Article I, Sec ,3, CI. 5 "The Senate shall choose their other
officers, and also a President protemoore , in the absence
of the Vice-President, or when he shall execute the office
of president of the United Stafcaa . " ^

corresDondinp; ag;oncies wield in the House. Individual sena-
tors enjoy greater freedom of action and possess more exten-
sive powers of obstruction and decision than do representa-
tives. In the Senate, the minority as well as the majority,
has a steering committee. On the whole, however, the same
elaborate standing committee system exists, with the excep-
tion that the Senate has a few more standing committees
which find no olace in the House, e.g., judiciary committee,
committee on foreign relations.
Senate committees have from three to seventeen members
each. Committee positions are divided between the parties
in about the same ratio as in the House, In contrast with
members of the House, a majority of whom belong to only one
committee, most senators must serve on four or five commit-
tees. Senatorial committees are composed in the same manner
as are committees in the House, Each party caucus appoints
a committee to distribute committee positions, including
chairmanships; and when the committee selections are approved
by the party caucuses, they are reoorted to the Senate for
formal ratification. "In the aopointment of the standing
committees, the Senate, unless otherwise ordered, shall
proceed by ballot to appoint severally the chairman of each
committee, and then by one ballot, the other members necessa-
ry to complete the same.""^^ Formerly, chairmen or ranking
members of a few imoortant committees were able to "exert
a disproportionate influence upon legislation because of the
72. Senate Rule XXIV.
••
40
rule which required them to be appointed to the conference
committees that f.djust most of the differences arising over
73
measures passing the two houses in dissimilar form," For
example, in the sixty-fifth Congress, 105 conference commit-
tees were appointed and 5 senators served on eighty-two of
them; Senator Smoot on thirty-three. Senator Warren on twenty
three. Senator Lodge on nine. This situation was remedied to
a degree in 1919 when a rule was adopted forbidding any Sen-
ator to be ehairman of more than one of the ten most impor-
tant committees or a member of more than two such committees,
Exceot with this modification, the seniority rule holds sway
In the Senate to practically the same extent as in the House,
"one of the customs of long standing in both houses," so the
seniority rule is defined, "is that which elevates members to
the chairmanship of committees upon the basis of their sen-
iority of service on such committees Thus Senator Borah
was given the chairmanship of the important Committee on For-
eign Relations because of his seniority of service, although
completely out of sympathy with the foreign policies of Pres-
ident Coolidge or of the majority in the Senate itself."'''''^
As chairman of this committee, the Senator indubitably ex-
erted whatever influence he could—and certain it must be
that on meny occasions the influence of his position was the
determining factor in the committee's decision for action or
73. Introduction to American Govt., Ogg and Kay, p. 455.
74. ibid.
75. Documents and Readings in American Government, Mathews
and Berdahl, p. 342,
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inaction-^-?nake ineffectual what he thoup;ht to be improper
forei^^n policy even though such policy be in accord with
the manifest will of the Senate. Now, if it be not improper
to presuae that the majority opinion in the Senate did really
reflect the sovereie;n will, we have here a case in which a
sintj-le member of this august body, solely by reason of the
application of the seniority rule, is able to delay or to
prevent the exoression of sovereign will. This rule, how-
ever, is only one of many. The Senate has its body of
printed rules r. nd oarliamentary precedents and falls back on
Jefferson's manual to a greater extent than does the House,
Its rules are fewer and simpler.
3) The Lobby. "Lobby," a small hall, anteroom or wait-
ing room, has by figure of speech come to be applied in the
United States to the men who frequent the approaches to leg-
islative chambers for the purpose of addressing individual
argument to lawmakers, or of otherwise influencing votes.
"Ever since representative assemblies began, citizens have
visited them for the purpose of persuasion. Certainly the
practice was known in the colonial days of ilmerica
When the colonies had come together, their Congress began
at once to be the scent; of individual pressure, and under
the new Constitution, Alexander Hamilton speedily develooed
the fine art of lobbying."'''^ "Lobbying is the practice of
exerting influence uoon legislators so as to achieve the
passage of desired legislation or orevent the oassage of un-
76. Legislative Assemblies, Luce, p. 367-
II
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desired laws, hy some it is advertently labelled 'pressure
oolltics.' Hundreds of organized grouos retain lep;islative
counsels in Washington for at least a portion of the legis-
lative year. Different lobbyists employ different tactics,"'^
Accordingly, lobbyists are attacked or defended. It seems,
however, that the lobby has been attacked and discredited
more often than it has been praised and defended, so that
now "men who for hire work to help or hinder legislation,
whether as legislative counsel (i.e., those who appear at
public hearings) or as legislative agents (lobbyists), must
register their employment in advance, and at the end of the
session their emplc> 'j.-^ must report the amotmt paid."'''®
What justification, if any, is there for the continued
existence of the lobby? How does it effect the determina-
tion and expression of sovereign will? The argument has
been advanced that so long as political parties refuse to
function by avoiding real issues upon which intelligent
Dopular will may be expressed, so long is the lobby justi-
fied, for it does make possible the advancement of issues
through the activity of pressure groups ."^^ But there is
another and more serious argument for the perpetuation of
the lobby. It is true that democratic dogma postulates that
the citizenry put the thought of national welfare before
that of the individual; such an attitude, it is said, consfci-
77. Documentary Source Book in American Govt., Ewing and
Dangerfie Id, p. 376.
78. Legislative Assemblies, Luce, p. 372,
79. Our Governmental Machine, Y/allace, p. 40.
1t
tutes a well-disposed public sentiment. The citizens
should take a broad view of national affairs. Consequently,
it is supposed, that "the tendency of associations and
leagues of citizens formed for the accomplishment of their
own particular purposes, if2;nores the theory that the gen-
eral good should be the consideration of the citizen be-
fore that of any one group, it fails to consider that men
live their lives not as citizens of a state or voters in
a congressional district, but as members of various busi-
ness, social, fraternal and economic units
They are astced at certain seasons to cease being doctors
or grocers or pacifists and become simply citizens and
voters," The lobby strives for a more complete repre-
sentation of the peoole in Congress. It promotes legisla-
tive consideration of the people not merely as Republicans
or Democrats but as workers, students, disabled old men
and farmers. Thus, the lobby allows for a more adequate
determination of the sovereign will, and consequently,
for a truer expression of such will. Under the theory
of representative government (explained supra) whereby
legislators are presumed to hold to a broad national ooint
of viev/ and think only in terms of the oublic good, a
multitude of groups have sprung up and are actively at work
day in and day out in the definite role as spokesmen for
80. Group Representation Before Congress, Herring, p. 4.
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the citizens they represent. \''nien the legal machinery of
representation was established by the Constitution, the
party developed as a means of working this machine. I^ow
"there has developed an extra-legal machinery of as
integral and of as influential a nature as the party system
of government that has long been an essential part of
government, though not originally incorporated within the
Constitution. "81
"it is at the hearings held by the congressional
committees that the lobbyist today performs his heavy work.
The legislative processes thus give the lobbyist a very ex-
cellent opportunity most of the real work is done in
committee where many of the real workers are the lobbyists.
They are the men with the facts at their command
The legislative agent arranges the data to be brought for-
ward and selects the witnesses of his groups, ii^ is truly
a member of the 'assistant government "^^
One more word about the lobby. It is a well-known fact
that the party caucus disciplines party members (in various
ways) and that any deviation from the policies as determined
by the party is punishable . Consequently, party members
generally adhere to party policy. If an organized group
brings pressure to bear on a congressman and threatens to
defeat him at the polls unless he supports its measure, he
81. ibid, p. 18.
82. ibid, p. 71.
/
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may well hesitate to adhere to the party policy if the meas-
ure is opposed by the party caucus. As a matter of fact,
"a powerful p:roup acting as the representative of an in-
fluential body of citizens often has the supoort of the dom-
inant party"83 by virtue of the fact that it represents a
definite group of citizens who by their very organization
become powerful.
4) The "invisible Government." To define democracy as
that form of government in which the people rule is to give
only half a definition, "It is a form of government in
which the door is thrown ooen for the free play of powerful
deterministic factors of a physical or psychological charac-
ter, acting through the intermediary of the popular will..,.
One ol' the laws of politics which popular sovereignty must
obey is the law of geographic determinism. (Geography
creates political problems and often determines the manner
of their ultimate solution.) The determinism of racial
heritage is a factor which all intelligent students of com-
parative politics take into their reckonings The sover-
eignty of the people is assumed to manifest itself in the
rule of the majority, but this assumotion collides with
another law of politics, to wit, the inevitt^ble inclination
of all governments to autocracy." Because of the inherent
tendencies of governments to become governments by minority,
because of political manoeuvring, such as the gerrymander,
83, ibid, dp. 248-249
84. The Invisible Government ,W.B.Munro, po. 32,37,41,45,
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because of the prejudices (class prejudice, race prejudice,
sectionalism, etc.) which have manifested themselves in the
government by becoming institutionalized forms of behavior,
"if there is one thing in connection with our legislative
bodies that should be emphasized, it is the fact that they
do not accurately reflect the opinion of the country. "^^
perhaps the most important deterministic factor in our
"invisible government," and one which is often lauded, is
the political party. Many strong partisans argue the virtues
of party promotion and party obligation. "They, too, believe
in responsibility, but in resoons ibility to party leaders
rather than to the electorate. Such a doctrine is far from
absurd .Without organization nothing but chaos is to
be expected. *Jrganizat ion in politics is just as useful and
admirable in politics as in religion, ohilanthropy
,
business,
or any other of the social activities in which men join."
And it certainly is true that "even in Congress (despite
organizat ion( ? ) ) the public welfare is for the most part the
immediate rather than the ultimate consideration."®''' But
can there not be too much organization? The formal machinery
of the legislature provides for a speaker, other officers
and committees as agencies of the House as such, designed to
enable it to carry on business expeditiously and effectively.
But this formal machinery for House Control is enveloped and
85. Our Governmental Machine, ''/allace. Chapter XIII.
87. ibid, pf^ge 503.
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exceeded in actual power by an "invisible government"
developed by party practice and quite unknown to the rules.
"This extra-legal government consists primarily of the oarty
conferences or caucuses (i.e., private meetings of the mem-
bers of the House who belong to a given oarty), but includes
j
two further instrumentalities created by the caucuses, the
majority party's "steering committee" and the majority and
minority floor leaders. "QQ The operations of the majority
caucus extend to, at least (1) selection of the House officerj^
(2) listing members to be elected to the various standing
committees (3) agreement uoon plans for united action on
policies or measures before the House (4) supervision and
control of reports of important committees,^ and (C) actual
shaping of the detailed provisions of leading legislative
measures. As to the soeaker, instead of really electing
him as the Constitution orovides, the House merely ratifies
the slate of officers upon which the majority caucus agreed.
In view of the strict party discipline which usually ore-
vails, the decision of the majority in the majority caucus
determines the formal action of the House as a whole; thus
it is quite possible for a member to be elected speaker who
is not favored by the majority of the House as a whole.
88. Introduction to American ^overnraent, Ogg and Ray, p.444,
89, The Democratic majority caucus, April 1911, adopted a
resolution which directed the Democratic members of the
various committees of the House not to report to that
body on important legislative matters until they had
first communicated their proposed action to the caucus
and had received permission from that body to report.

The majority caucus functiona through its steering
committee and the chairman of this committee, the majority
floor leader. The steering committee decides which bills
to advance to final consideration and keeps "the tracks
clear--with the powerful assistance of the committee on
rules --for favorable action upon them."90 fphe floor leader
plans the debate and determines, in conjunction with the
minority leader, at which time the vote shall be taken, -i-t
is obvious, therefore, that the caucus machine, which is
itself controlled by a comparatively small group of ex-
perienced leaders, controls the House procedure and keeps
party members in tutelage, because "all party members,
wrhether in attendance at a eaucus or not, are bound by the
action taken, unless released by the caucus itself: and
the only grounds upon which members are likely to be re-
leased are constitutional objections and pledges to
constituents to take a different course from that decided
upon by the caucus. The action of a Democratic caucus is
binding upon members only if two-thirds have concurred. "^-^
90. Ibid, D.447
91. ibid, p.448

C. Congressional Procedure.
There are many external features of similarity in the
oarliaraentary procedure of democratic assemblies. Bills are
introduced, discussed by committees, debated on the floor,
amended and voted upon. This similarity may be explained
on two grounds, (1) the nature of the task and (2) the fact
that the procedure in most great legislatures developed out
of that in the Mother of Parliaments. "The influence of
the House of Commons was exerted most directly upon Congress
through the Manual of Parliamentary Practice which Thomas
Jefferson as Vice-President drew up to govern the procedure
of the Senate over which he presided. Jefferson simply
restated the current English practise, drawing freely upon
Hatsell's Precedents, The Manual was adopted by the House
of Representatives in 1837; it still regulates the procedure
in both houses except as subsequently modified,"
1) Authorship and Introduction of Measures . Although
the President or the head of an executive department may
suggest, or even assist in framing a bill, it may be got
formally before Congress only by being introduced by an ordi-
nary member of one of the two houses. The most important
measures, such as tariff and currency bills, usually emanate
from the approoriate committees, "The Constitution requires
92, Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Volume XII, p.455,
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that all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives. Every other kind of measure may
make its first aooearance in either house; indeed, through
its right to amend revenue bills, even to the extent of sub-
stituting new ones, the Senate may, in effect, originate
,,93
thera a Iso
.
Any member may, at any time, get a bill on the calendar
of the house of which he is a member by merely depositing a
cooy of it, indorsed with his signature, in a box on the
clerk's table, or if it is a public bill by handing it to
the presiding officer. If he wants or needs help in drawing
up his measure, he may avail himself of the legislative
drafting service^^of which there is a branch for each of
the two houses, "The bill is first dropped, let us say, by
Mr. X into a basket on the clerk's desk known as "the hop-
oer," The Speaker's clerk goes through the batch of new
bills, and assigns the X bill to the committee having juris-
diction. The bill is numbered and proper records are made
of its introduction and the bill is sent to the Government
Printing Office where a number of cooies of it are struck
off. The cooies are deposited in the Document Room of the
House, where they are procurable by the members, "^^
93. Introduction to American Govt., Qgg and Ray, p.455.
94. Established in 1918.
95. Congressional Digest, Vol VII, Feb. 1928.
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On the averap;e the House receives about 15,000 bills
during a long session, and the Senate a third as many, or
more. Many bills wear "by request" labels; this means that
the members formplly introducing them disclaim all respon-
sibility for them. Therefore, members are usually vril] ing
to introduce measures, however ill-considered and fantastic,
at the request of persistent lobbyists or of interested
groups of voters. Thus, "the true source" of the general
run of ""ills introduced "may usually be found in some
administrative official, or in some organization, or in
some constituent with a grievance, an ambition or a hope.
Congress is not to any material extent an originating
body. "96 The introduction of bills, it is well to note,
is limited to the members of Congress. No ordinary individ-
ual or group can bring to the official attention of Congress
any question of social justice or public policy, unless
a member of Congress consents to do this for him. As a
matter of fact, however, because of the common use made of
the "by request" labels, almost any person can have his
or some other Congressman introduce a bill. Consequently,
there is adequate provision in the American legislative
procedure for directing official notice to the many
matters of public policy.
96. Congress-An Explanation, Luce, p. 3.
i-
.
Once a bill has been introduced, i.e., official atten-
tion has been directed to a particular matter, provision
should bo made for the definition of Issues. This task
is assigned to the committee.
2) Reference to Conimittees . After the bills are
numbered and recorded by the clerk, they are referred to
standing; committees. "Private bills are turned over auto-
matically to the committee designated in each case by the
introducer. Public bills are sorted out and assigned,
according to the rules governing the subject, by the
97
clerk." 'i^en a bill can be assigned with equal aporo-
priateness to more than one committee, the Speaker decides
what shall be done, different parts of the bill being some-
times sent to different committees. Occasionally, a bill
is recalled from one committee and sent to another. In
any case, after being referred, the bill is printed and
distributed to all House members
,
3) Committees , Because Congress is usually in session
in the afternoon, committees regularly meet in the fore-
noon. No House committee tCommittee on Rules excepted) may
hold a meeting while the House is in session, without
special permission.
97. cf. Note 93.
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if and when coranittees are overburdened with work, they
may create sub-coimuittees (consistinp- usually of five mem-
bers) to which they may assign measures or classes of meas-
ures or even individual sections of the same measui-e . These
sub-committees, like the committees themselves, contain
representatives of both parties with the majority party alway
in control. After aporising itself of the contents of a
bill, the committee decides whether legislation is needed,
whether the present bill is adequate and the probable con-
sequences of its passage. "The members of the committee
obtain the desired inforiiiat icn by availing themselves of
(1) the resources of the committee library (2) the Library
of Congress (including the division of legislative reference-)
(3) djpta truental files (4) studies of its sub-committees
(5) recommendations of special committees or commissions of
investigation, authorized, or even appointed, by Congress
(6) data derived from investigations of ^^overniuental execu-
tive officers at the request of Congress and (7) especially
by holding; hearings at which almost any person having inter-
ests at stake, or having information or ideas to present,
can appear, whether in favor of or opposed to the bill.

These committee hearings resemble court procedure; paid
attorneys argue for or against the bill and interested per-
sons give testimony, while the committee members listen and
ask questions. Attendance of the general public is per-
mitted, though not encouraged."^®
Thereafter the committee goes into executive session
and reaches its conclusions in private. It is considered
breach of good faith for any member to reveal what occurred
in committee and the votes taken are never made a matter of
public record. In discussing executive sessions, Robert
99
Luce had said that here is "the most interesting, important
and useful part of the work of a congressman, and the part
of which the public knows nothing. Indeed, the ignorance of
the public about it is one of the causes of its usefulness.
Behind closed doors nobody can talk to the galleries or the
newspaper reporters. Buncombe is not worth while. Only
sincerity counts." The committee may report the bill un-
changed, modified, frame a new bill in the alternative or
may make no report at all, i.e., "pigeon-hole" the bill.
Only about Z0% of all bills and resolutions introduced get
beyond the committee stage. Generally, measures which do
not strike the fancy of the committeemen offhand are "pigeon'
holed."
"Under a rule adopted in 1925 fRule XXVII clause 4)
98. cf Note 93
99, Congress-An Explanation, p,12

it is possible to discharge a committee which has had a
f!;lveii bill or resolution for as long as thirty dnya orovided
^
(a) a oetition for such action has been signed by a majority
of the House (b) a motion to discharge has been seconded 7
days later by a majority and (c) after debate, a majority •
votes to discharge, For all practical purposes, however,
any bill can still be killed in its initial stage by simple
failure of the committee, having it in charge, to report."-^
If the committee decides to report it in its original
form or with amendments, "it is then reported to the House
!
by the committee with a recommendation that it be passed,..,,
j
The Clerk receives the bill and refers it and the report to
I
the Calendar If in the view of the Rules Committee the
bill deserves prompt and special consideration that committee
may bring in a rule for its immediate consideration and pre-
scribe the terms under which it may be considered, overriding
all rules save the rule for a motion to recommit . "^'^•^
The framing of revenue measures is the peculiar function
of the Ccimmittee- on Ways and Means in the House, which, to-
gether with the corresDond ing senntorial committee on fin-
ance, because of the political importance of such measures,
has become second in importance to no other strictly legis-
lative committee, "in the framing of tariff bills the minori
I ty members of the committee have little or no influence.
100, Introduction to American Govt., Ogg and Ray, p. 461,
101. Documentary Source Book in American Govt, and Politics,
Ewing and Dangerfield, Chapter XIX.
i
The majority members are divided into a number of sub-
committees, each of which is charged with the preparation of
some portion of the bill (during which process) public
hearings may be held for the purpose of gathering informa-
tion; and lobbyists, representing the varied special inter-
ests which are likely to be benefited or affected adversely
by tariff changes, are actively engaged in attempts to influ-
ence the action of the majority members of the committee,'
After the majority members have agreed on the final form of
the bill, the minority members are called in so that a vote
may be had on the measure. It is then reportea to the House
where it is debated and where the minority is given an
opportunity to express criticism afto:^' v.hich the bill is in-
variably passed as a party measure. Having passed the House,
the bill goes to the Sene^te from where, if important changes
are there introduced, it goes back to the House and is
immediately referred to a conference committee representing
both houses which attempts to effect a compromise. Whatever
this committee agrees upon, and it works in secret, is
almost certain to pass both houses.
102, cf. Note 100. To the effect that there have been
certain instances in which schedules were prepared
outside the committee by lobbyists and representat iwes
of industries peculiarly interested in them which
were accepted by the committee practically unchanged
see Whom Does Congress Represent? C,A. Beard, Harper's
Magazine, January 1930, pp. 144-152.
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Recapitulating, the committ-itj has a three-fold func-
tion--(l) it should define the issues relative to the parti-
cular bill or prouosal under consideration (2) it should
enable all parties who could be helpful to appear and give
oertinant testimony, and (3) it should determine the facts
and report its conclusions to the main body of the House.
Let ua examine the situation with greater particularity and
see what really does occur. As has already been noted,
since so many bills are introduced that full and adequate
consideration to each is a virtual impossibility in the
main body of each House, the bills are referred for consid-
eration by committees . If each committee were to be ideally
efficient and report its findings on every bill referred
to it back to the House, the latter would then have to per-
mit either a clogged calender, in which case the majority
oarty would be publicly branded by the minority grouo as
grossly inefficient, or the House would have to act on every
bill it referred to the committees, in which event both
majority and minority groups would have to account to John Q.
Public for their actions on every bill— a distasteful matter
to both. Consequently, the committees are ideally in-
efficient and report back to the House only such matters as
tend tov/ards the fulfilment of the majority party program,
or some other measure which the majority party is willing
to dramat ize--and, of course, then only after such action
I
has been ordered by the pfirty caucus
.
Again, since committees are constructed along party lines
and since the majority party is interested in the passage of
measures which tend to fulfill its promises, the issues
framed and discussed are inevitably tinged with party senti-
ment, exceot in rare cases. The reliance of Congressional
coiiiniittees on legislative counsel and agents for the appear-
ance of interested parties is notorious to all persons at;
all familiar with this procedure. This practice, however,
shoulo not be too hastily condemned. Legislative counsel
represent interests in manner not unlike attorneys who
reoresent clients in judicial courts. Legislative agents
are experts in their fields and the aid and assistance which
they render to the committeemen saves many hours, and even
weeks, to the latter as well as dollars to the public.
Finally, the committee must decide the facts. This it gen-
erally does. But the reoort goes to the party caucus.
V'Jhether the facts revealed in the reoort will ever be made
public is determined by that irresponsible majority caucus.
This unofficial body, accountable to no one, determines
whether any cause will have its day in court,
4) The Calendars . A bill reported back to the Clerk of
the House is placed on one of the three "calendars," which

means that it Is before the House for consideration at such
time as it can be reached. The calendars are:--(l) Calendar
of the Whole House on the State of the Union (i.e., Union
Calendar), Revenue bills, general appropriation bills,
public bills directly or indirectly approoriat ing money or
property are listed on this calendar, (2) House Calendar.
This calendar contains public bills not directly or indirect-
ly appropriating money or property. (3) Calendar of the
Committee on the ^ATiole House { i .e . ,Private Calendar). Pri-
vate or "special" are placed here.
Theoretically, bills are considered in such order as
they appear on the calendars. As a matter of practice,
however, because of the congested condition, the most impor-
tant bills are selected and considered, even though out of
turn.
5) The Order of Business in the House . The normal order
103
of daily business has been described as follows:
"CD speaker calls the House to order; (2) chaplain offers
prayer: f3) Journal of previous day's proceedings is read
and approved; (4) reference to public bills is corrected:
(5) business "on the speaker's table," i.e., presidential
messages, bills with Senate amendments, etc. which await
the speaker's presentation to the House, is dispose of:
('6) "unfinished" business engaged in at the time of adjourn-
ment is completed: (7) "morning hour" is given to a consid-
103. Introduction, to American Government ,Ogg and Ray, p. 461,
iI
eration of p;eneral bills called up from one of the calendars
by committees which have reoorted favorably: (8) if time
allows, the House ^oes into committee of the Whole to dis-
cuss bills on the Union Calendar, or, if none such are pend-
ing, on House Calendar. TH« House, on motion of a member,
votes to resolve itself into a committee of the ^AHiole to
consider private bills or some certain public bill; the
speaker yields the chair to a soecial chairman whom he desig
nates; 100 members constitute a quorum instead of the maj-
ority required when the House is in regular session; debate
proceeds informally, only 5 minutes allowed to each speaker
unless with unanimous consent; no roll-calls; divisions are
taken by rising vote or by tellers; when consideration is
completed, the committee votes to "rise," the speaker re-
ceives the chair and chairman of the committee reports the
action taken with such amendments as may have been recommend
8d. The House must, of course, act affirmatively upon
committee's report in order to give it effect,"
6) The "Three Readings." To be passed, every bill or
resolution must have three readings. The first reading
is by title only: "This requirement is deemed met by print-
ing the title in the Congressional Record and Journal. The
bill then goes to a committee, and if reported back is
placed upon the calendar for a second reading at a date
agreed upon between the committee and speaker and the
majority floor leader."
104. ibid.
c
The second reading takes place in the committee of the
Whole or in the House itself and consists of an actual read-
ing in full with opportunity to offer amendments, A vote
follows CM the question, "Shall the bill be engrossed and
read a third time?" Debate usually takes nlace on ordering
the bill to a third reading, the members of the committee
speaking alternately pro and con on the question, if the re-
port is not unanimous, and finally, if time remains, members
of the House are recognized. Exdept with unanimous consent,
no member may sneak for more than an hour. Debate is closed
chiefly by advance agreement or by moving the "p^^'^vious
question," in which case, if it is carried with a quorum
present, the vote is forthwith taken on the question. If
there has been no debate at all, the Speaker is required to
allow a discussion lasting for 40 minutes.
If this stage is successfully passed, the third reading
takes place, by title only, unless a member demands a read-
ing in full. Then, --after engrossment—and only then, comes
the vote on the measure's final passage. If it is now
passed, the bill or resolution is ready to go to the Senate.
7 ) The Methods of Voting . There are four methods of
voting in the American Congress. First, a division by simple
sound of voices, that is a viva voce vote. Second, any
member may demr.nd a rising vote whereupon the supporters of
each side of the question are counted. Thirdly, one-fifth
of a quorum may demand a vote by tellers. Members in favor

of the measure, followed by those opposed, pass between the
tellers who declRred the result which is announced by the
chair. And fourthly, one-fifth of those present may demand
a "Yeas and Nays" vote. The clerk calls the members' names
who resoond Aye or No. The individual votes are recorded
and the result is then announced. This method may be de-
manded before any other method has been emoloyed. V/hen the
question is one of passing a measure over a presidential
veto, the Constitution requires the Yeas and Nays to be taken
and recorded,^
8) The Procedure in the Senate . After a bi^-l is passed
in the House, it is certified by the Clerk who then carries
it to the Senate Chamber where it is received by the pre-
siding officer. The Vice-President then refers it to the
approoriate Senate Committee where it undergoes another pro-
cess of examination substantially in the same way es in the
House. There are some important differences, however,
betv/een the Senate and House procedures. First, not only
revenue and other financial measures, but all bills are con-
sidered by the Senate in Coimnittee of the V/hole and without
change of presiding officer. Secondly, there is no privi-
leged business,^ in the Senate so that the calendar order
is followed unless there is unanimous consent or a majority
105. Article I, Section 7, Clause 2.
106. cf Note 101.
107. Practically, however, appropriation bills enjoy a
certain priority.
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vote to the contrary. Finally, there are no restrictions
on the lenp;th of speeches, except as are occasionally agreed
to in respect to a oarticular measure. "Wo senator may,
without consent, speak more than twice on the same subjecib;
in a single day. Except for the "unanimous consent" pro-
cedure and the infrequent use of the closure rule, adopted
in 1917, to prevent filibustering, debate proceeds without
limitation. "108
9) Conference Committees . If the bill is amended by
the Senate and the House accepts the amendment, the bill,
as amended, is signed by the Speak'^r and Vice-president and
is presented by the Committee on Enrolled Bills to the Pres-
ident. If the two houses fail to agree on the amended bill,
it is submitted to a committee representing both houses
which attempts to smooth out the points in disagreement.
"If agreement is reached by this committee, an identical
report is made to each house under rules that orevent amend-
ment but permit only acceptance or rejection of the report
as a whole, "^^^ Since the House and Senate each may amend
108. Senate Manual, Rule XXII. A petition to close the de-
bate must be signed by 16 senators. On the second calendar
day after this petition has been filed the roll of senstors
is called on the question, "is it the sense of the Senate
that the debate shall be brought to a close?" If there is
a two-thirds vote in the affirmative, the measure becomes
unfinished business until disposed of, to the exclusion of
all other business, no amendments being thenceforth allowed
and no senator being permitted to speak more than one hour
altogether and all points of order being decided by the
chair without debate,
109. Decuments and Readings in American Government,
Mathews and Berdahl, p. 344,

the bills of the other, and since no bill can become law
until and unless every onrt and feature of it has been con-
curred in by both branches of Congress, the services of a
conference committee are regularly used to iron out differ-
ences, and it is for that reason that its recommendations
are generally accepted by both houses.
10) The Final Stages . When a bill is passed in identi-
cal form by both houses, it is "enrolled" (i.e., written
or orinted on parchment) and is thereuoon signed by the
presiding officers of each house and sent to the President
for his approval or veto. If it is vetoed, it goes back
to the house in which it originated for reconsideration;
it may become law then only if it is thereafter oassed in
both houses by a two-thirds majority vote. The President
may aoprove a bill by signing it, "if any bill shall not
be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays ex-
ceoted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same
shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless
the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return; in
which case it shall not be a law." If the bill is
signed, or if it becomes law through presidential inaction,
it is transmitted to the Department of State, to be deposited
in the archives, and also to be duly published.
110. U.S .Constitution, Article I, Section 7, Clause 2,
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ENGLISH PROCKDTJKK FOK THE DEFINITION
AND EXPRESSION OF SOVEREIGN WILL.
A. Parties Participating.
"ordinarily there are three oarties to lef^islat ion--
the King, the Lords r nd the Coioinons Laws are made by an
assembled Parliament, and by the concurrence of one House
or both the Houses of which Parliament consists, and of the
Crown Under exceptional circumstances which may arise
under the provisions of the Parliament Act, legislation is
affected by the King and Commons alone, "-^
The Cabinet. In thus describing the parties partici-
pating in English legislation. Sir William must have re-
ferred to the formal parties only. There can be no real and
intelligent discussion of English legislation without a
consideration of that extra-legal body known as the Cabinet.
It is the cabinet ministers who guide and control the work
of Parliament, in both branches. "They prepare the Speech
from the Throne in which the condition of national affairs
is reviewed and a program of legislation set forth at the
opening of every parliamentary session: they formulate,
introduce, explain and urge the adoption of legislative
measures upon all manner of subjects In short, the cabi-
net ministers make decisions and formulate policies on all
weighty matters requiring attention, and ask of parliament
1 T.Vift T.flw find flij<^tnni of the Const Sir* inm R An^on VnT T
p>47. = = '
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only that it take whatever action is requisite to make these
decisions or policies effective,"^ In other words, the cabi-
net plans the business of g;overnment ; it submits, explains
and defends its policies; and finally, it executes such of
its plans and policies as are approved by Parliament. The
cabinet is a real party participating in the PJnglish legis-
lative process.
The Cabinet consists of a prime minister and of those
ministers considered of great enough importance to warrant
their inclusion in the executive advisory council which de-
cides upon the main lines of policy; the cabinet is an inner
group of the ministry. These members are not appointed as
members of the cabinet (the cabinet is neither formally nor
legally recognized^) but are elevated to membership in the
King's Privy Council. Tne number of cabinet members varies
from time to time,^ Cabinet members have a dual responsi-
bility: they are collectively responsible to the King and
to Parliament and individually responsible to each other.
"The most important collective function of the cabinet is to
formulate the policy of the nation and the legislative pro-
gram for each session of Parliament, 'ihe various items In
this program are then introduced as government measures with
the prestige of a unanimous cabinet behind them When
2, European Governments and Politics, F.A.Ogg, d.99.
3, Not a single word may be found in the written laws con-
cerning its composition, powers, duties, or responsi-
bilities ,
4, The uausl number is about twenty.

the British prime minister and his cabinet announce that a
bill will be introduced, or a new tax levied, or a treaty
concluded-- the announcement of their decision virtually
settles the matter, parliament must accept their decision
or P:et a new ministry from top to bottom,"^
The prinie minister, head of the ministry, cabinet and
government, is the leader of that political party which con-
trols a majority in the House of Commons. He is always a
party leader. "Each political party determines for itself
the methods by which its own leader is chosen, ordinarily,
however, the selection is made by a caucus which is attended
by the party *s membership in the House of Commons along
with various other prominent party workers,"^ When one cabi-
net loses the confidence of the House, the leader of the
opposition is called to form a new cabinet. Although minis-
terial responsibility does not postulate a two party system,
this principle "can be much more smoothly operated when there
are only two parties, one controlling the government and the
other constituting 'the opposition' cabinets which are
formed from a single party, and are suoported by a single
party, do far better work than those which represent coali-
tions and are supported by blocs."'''
The fact that every minister must be a member of one of
5. The Governments of Europe, W.B.Munro, p. 83.
6. ibid, D.69.
7. ibid, p. 88.
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the Houses of Parliament does not mean tht^t he must be such
a member at the time of his apoointraent. If at the time of
his apoointraent to the ministry he is not a member of either
House, he may become a member of Parliament either by being
elevated to a oeerapie and thus acquirinp; a seat in the House
of Lords, or, as is usual, by ooenine; a constituency, i.e.,
inducing some member of the House of Commons to vacate his
seat and make way for the newly-appointed minister. The
statuatory rule of 6 Anne, that any member of the House of
Commons who accepts a position of profit from the Crown
should thereby lose his seat, was modified in 1919 by The
Reelection of Ministers Act® so that the acceotance of a
ministerial post within nine months after a general election,
by such a member, does not compel the new minister to vac-
ate his seat. In any other case, "on accepting office, the
..9
new minister must go home and get himself reelected."
Theoretically, the Cabinet is resoonsible to the House
of Commons for everything that it does; but in reality, the
House acts in accordance with its leadership and direc-
tion,^^ "Modern rules of procedure give to the Government
of the day a large control over the time of the House for the
Durposes of its own business, while the introduction of the
closure leaves the time for discussion of a government meas-
8. 9 George V, Chapter 2.
9. Governjnents of ii;uroDe, Munro, p. 73.
10. ibid, p. 81.
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ure very Icirgely in th-e hands of the Government. The con-
sequence of these various features of our political life at
the present time is to make the House of Corimons dependent
on the Cabinet rather than the Cabinet on the Commons, The
threat of dissolution issuintz; from the Prime Minister
as representing the collective wisdom of the Cabinet, may
secure the continued loyalty of a majority in the House of
Commons long after the composition of the House has ceased
to correspond with the political opinion of the country. A
member may have ceased to be in sympathy with the members
of his party, but he may also feel that small as will be
his chances of re-election in any event, that they would
disappear altogether if he broke the bonds of party alle-
11giance." Nevertheless, the ministry is responsible to the
Commons; and although there is no statuatory requirement
that it go out of office v^henever it loses the support and
confidence of the majority, "by a custom which has now pre-
vailed for nearly 200 years, it is bound to do so. The
ministry must always be able to demonstrate, by vote of the
majority in the Commons, that it possesses the confidence of
the country. Loss of this confidence means loss of office."
The House of Commons may demonstrate its lack of confidence
in the Cabinet by voting to reduce a minister's salary, by
rejecting a government measure, by enacting a measure which
11. Law and Custom of the Constitution, Anson, Vol. II, p. 135
12. Governments of Europe, Munro, p. 85.

the cabinet opposes, or by simply passing a resolution declar-
inn; its want of confidence. It is then the privilege of the
cabinet to make an appeal to the people, by advising the
king to dissolve Pt^rliament and to order a general election,
or, to resign. "it is true, I think, to say that in the
last one hundred years the power which determines the exist-
ence and extinction of Cabinets has shifted, first from the
Crown to the Commons, and then from the Commons to the elec-
torate. But it is no longer true that the House of Commons
is always a close reflection of the ooinion of the country
or that it responds to changes of public opinion as they
may occur di ring the existence of a parliament . "^"^
It is no longer as important, as it was formerly, for
the Cabinet to "retain the confidence" of the House of Lords.
The Lords may not be sent home and told to be reelected; on
the other hand, their decisions are not final and binding
(see discussion infra) and do not present any insuperable
obstacles to the execution of the cabinet's proposals.
English parliamentary procedure is based on the orinciple
that the dominant political party, through its majority in
the House of Commons, under the leadership of the ministry,
is responsible for the fulfillment of its program. There
are no checks and balances to stand in its way; it cannot
13. ibid, p. 86,
14. Law and Custom of the Constitution, Anson, Vol. II, P. 133,

avoid, make excuses or blame some other branch of the gov-
ernment. It hE.8 been said that the cabinet is txie "execu-
tive com-nittee" of parliament, "parliament ia assumed to
reflect the will of the people, and the cabinet is charged
with the function of carrying this popular will into effect
„lb
through its advisory control of the crown. ' Said Sir
William, " the Cabinet is the motive power in our
execut ive . "-^^ Thus, as members of the Privy Council, the
members of the Cabinet are the real sources wherefrom eman-
ate the executive Orders-in-Counc il issued by the Crown.
The House of Lords . This organization, the oldest
legislative body in the world, has a membershio of about
seven hundred men. It consists of more than six hundred
English peers, sixteen peers from Scotland, twenty-eight
from Ireland and twenty-six "lords spiritual," i.e., two
archbishops of the Established Church (Canterbury and York)
together with twenty-four bishops. ^"^ These persons are mem-
bers of the House of Lords by virtue of the particular status
which is theirs and not because they stand for any special
princioles or because they represent any particular party;
although as a matter of fact the comDlexion of the opinion
in this House is decidedly conservative. Membership in
this body continues throughout the lifetime of the member.
Englishmen may become members of the House of Lords through
15, Governments of Europe, Munro, pp. 76, 197
16, Note 14 at page 142.
17, Governments of Europe, Munro, pp.106, 110
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being elevated to a peerage-^^ecause of some aigniflcant
contribution to civilization or because of some other out-
standing achievment. "So while the House of Lords is un-
reoresentat iTe in the usual sense of the terra, it is not
altogether unrepresentative of the best in british national
life--in industry, finance, agriculture, commerce, law,
religion and scholarshin . "-^^
The sessions of the House of Lords are oresided o\irer by
the lord chancellor who is appointed by the Crown upon the
advice of the cabinet. Although usually he either is or is
made a member of this House, there is no legal requirement
to this effect. The Lords meet in sessions coincident with
those of the Commons. "When the House of Commons ends its
session the upper chamber does likewise; but each House can
adjourn separately."
The lord chancellor puts motions, but does not have any
disciplinary powers. He "is not to adjourn the House, or
do anything else 8 3 mouth of the House, without consent of
the Lords first had, except the ordinary thing about bills...
wherein the Lords may likewise overrule. "^^ "He does not
even have the power to recognize peers who desire to speak,
^AHien two of them rise simultaneously the House decides, if
necessary, whom it will hear."
18. Members of the peerage have no votes at parliamentary
elections (ibid, o.ll5)
19. ibid, d.127("a peer has no constituents to humor or im-
press. He represents no one but himself." p. 117)
20. ibid, p. 116
21. Standing Orders XX 22 .Govts of Europe ,Munro.p .116
f
A quorum to do business consists of three members; at
23least thirty must be present to pass any law. The House
rules are very liberal. Any peer may initiate a debate at
almost any time and on any matter of public importance by
merely "moving for papers" (i.e., offering a resolution ask-
ing that certain official documents be laid before the
House), Thus, a full discussion may be precipitated in the
Lords at any time on any question on which a long debate
in the Commons is precluded by the pressure of business.
This is the way in which the Lords may draw public attention
24
to any question.
In the House of Lords, unlike the House of Commons,
there are no standing committees for public bills. All
bills, after two formal readings are debated in Committee
of the Hhole House before being read a third time. Debates
cannot be shut off by using the closure. If amendments are
adopted, the measure goes back to the Commons for concur-
rence. "Then the House of Commons either agrees to the
amendments, or insists on its own way, or some compromise
is reached by an informal conference. Pfeiling this, the
bill is deemed to have been rejected, and the Commons must
then decide v/hether the measure is of sufficient importance
to warrant its repassage in accordance with the procedure
laid down in the Parliament Act."^
23. ibid
24. ibid, pp. 116-117
25. ibid, p. 126.
{
Financial meosures must originate in the Commons; any
other public bill may be introduced in the House of Lords,
"Until 1911 it wen technically the privilep;e of the Lords
to reject any bill, even a money bill. But by non-use the
upper House had lost its right to amend any financial meas-
ure, and in the opinion of many constitutional lawyers it
had also lost, by non-use over a long term of years, its
right to reject, although the Lords themselves had never
conceded this loss. As to bills other than money bills there
never was any question, prior to 1911, that the House of
Lords might both amend and reject anything sent up by the
Commons. Under ordinary conditions when the House of Lords
rejected a measure that had been passed by the Commons
there was some grumbling in the Green Chamber but nothing
happened. If the rejected bill was an important government
measure, introduced by the ministers and passed under their
guidance, the prime winister could advise a dissolution of
oarliament and a general election on the issue. This would
out the matter before the high court of public opinion for
judgment. Then, if the people upheld the ministry, the
Lords were expected to give way, which they usually did."
It was not until 1909 that a dead-lock over the Lloyd
George budget between the Lords and Commons arose in such
form and assumed such bitterness as to compel the making of
26. ibid, pp, 110, 119

a new orovision which took the form of the Parliament Act
of 1911. The outstanding orovisions of this Act are:--
1) Money measures, if passed by the House of CornEions,
become law one month after such passage, even though the
Lords withhold their concurrence.
2) In case of disagreement, the decision of the Speaker
of the Commons is final and conclusive on the question as
to whether e bill is a money bill within the definition pro-
vided in the Act.
3) Any other public bill passed by the Comraons in three
consecutive sessions, with an interval of at least two
years between its first and final passage, becomes law on
receivihg the assent of the Crown, notwithstanding the fail-
ure of the Lords to approve the measure. To be exact, the
two year interval must elapse between the date of the first
occasion on which the bill receives its second reading in
the Commons and the date of its final passage for the third
27
time. ^
4) The majcimum duration of a parliament is to be five
years instead of seven, except that Parliament can at any
time extend its own lifetime beyond this five year term if
any emergency so requires.
The Lords suggested an alternative scheme which was
27. The Act specifically provides that this stipulation
shall not apply to any measure extending the duration
of Parliament beyond its present maximum of five years.
rr
not acceptable to the Commons, It was not until another
c^eneral election had been held and a threat to create new
peers had been issued that the upper chamber was "cowed
into submission" to accept this bill. Thus today, the gen-
eral utility of the House of Lords in the legislative pro-
cess is that it examines and revises non-financir.l measures
When the occasion arises, it may compel a full public dis-
cussion of a measure before it is enacted into the law of
the land. By interposing this delay before passage of a
bill, the House of Lords gives an opportunity for passions
to subside and for a calm, sober second thought to prevail.
The House of Commons . This body is the classic ex-
ample of a legislature with virtually unlimited authority.
The absence of any constitutional restraint gives it suprem
acy in lawmaking. The present House consists of 615 mem-
bers coming from England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ire-
land (Ulster), The country is divided into constituencies
from which members to the House of Commons are elected.
Most constituencies elect one member; there are, however,
some two-member constituencies. Each member represents
about 75,000 persons or about 40,000 voters.
Although members are elected by constituencies, they
regard themselves as representatives of the United Kingdom,
at large, and do not think of their own districts first,
last and always 0*^° But this does not mean that the average
28, Governments of Europe, Munro, p,164.
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member enters the House of Commons unpledged and independent.
"Under the present system, with the increasea strength of
political organization, a candidate offers himself, not so
much dn his own merits, as because he is the nominee of the
political association or caucus which professes to repre-
sent his oarty, and because he undertakes to supnort a
given programme and the leaders of the party. Edmund
Burke's argument that "your reoresentative owes you not his
industry only, but his judgment also, and he betrays instead
of serves you if he sacrifices it to your opinions
I did not obey your instructions. Wo, I conformed to the
instructions of truth and nature. I maintained your inter-
ests against your opinions"--this argument \m3 rejected by
his constituency; he was defeated. And Professor Munro
defends the decision of Parke's constituency as follows:
"a government in which a few oeoole, howsoever chosen, deter-
mine on their own discretion what the rights of other people
are, and what the people *s well-being demands--such a gov-
ernment would not be s democracy, but an oligarchy."
Thus, members of the House of Commons are expected to adhere
to the party platforms and policies. ^1 Both the public and
the members of parliament determine this relationship
Generally, the electors of a constituency can vote for only
29. The Law and Custom of the Const itut ion,Anson, Vol . II, p .134
30. Governments of Eurooe, d.165.
31. Law and Custom of the Constitution,Anson, Vol . I, p .161
"in the great malority of constituencies candidates are
chosen on strictly party lines."
(I )
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one candidate. "They must choose between two, and each one
of the two may be the nominee of the most zealous and un-
compromising members of the two political parties. It is
very possible that to a great many electors the two candi-
dates are alike distasteful, ivien of independent judgment
may not care to vote for a candidate whose chief recommen-
dation is that under no circumstances will he draw his
support from a given statesman, the leader of his party; or
that he accepts with implicit faith a set of dogmas or a
scheme of proposed legislation drawn up by active party
managers. Yet if they do not vote for such a candidate,
they must vote for his opponent, whose opinions may yet be
more distasteful to them, or they must cease to exercise the
privileges of an elector,""" Thus, since large bodies of
men have some difficulty in arriving at decisions, and since
many refrain from voting, "the candidates of each side are
selected by the really eager or extreme representatives of
each party in the division. "^^ This does not mean, however,
that the real and continuing tie betv/een the electors and
elected is this " or that group of extreme partisans
within the party. "Public opinion has made the tie between
the members and constituents (who are represented in and
express themselves through parties) reciprocal. A member,
during the lifetime of a Parliament to which he has been
52. ibid. "The edvent of third party candidates tend to con-
fuse the issue rather than to increase the freedom of
choice .
"
-33. ibid.
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elected, may continue to reoresent a constituency when he
is no longer in agreement with those who elected him, or
rather with the party organization which assumes to speak
for the majority of the electorate."'^'* What is this force
which compels continued representation? Public opinion.
To incur the mistrust or disfavor of public opinion is to
court defeat and curry disaster, "No member can retain his
seat and continuously neglect all his duties to his con-
stituency, and at the same time preserve his own self-respect
or the good opinion of the political and social world in
„35
which he moves,
- British subject who is qualified to be a voter may
stand for election to Parliament in any constituency. Women
are not barred. Residency in the constituency which one
seeks to represent is required neither by law nor by usage.
Thus, the field of selection of dandidates is enlarged and
high standards of qutlity and calibre are maintained, "A
defeated candidate may petition to have an election
invalidated by alleging corrupt or illegal practices on the
part of the victor or his agents. Such petitions are not
heard., as in America, by the legislature itself; they are
tried by the Courts (K.B.D.) which certify to the Speaker
of the House of Commons its report confirming or unseating
the member-elect. If the matter in dispute relates to the
54. The Unreformed House of Commons, Kdward and Annie
Porritt, Vol. II, p,255o
?5. ibid.
o.
I
legal qualifications of the elected candidate and not to
the manner of his election, it is investigated by the House
itself and is not referred to the Judges of the High Court
for a recommendation."^^
In the House of Commons, forty members constitute a
quorum. ^'^ A majority vote suffices to pass any measure, even
one deemed to be a constitutional amendment; the practice
of invoking the requirement of a two-thirds vote in certain
cases, as is the practice in America, has never been adop-
ted. "The completeness v/ith which the majority principle
has been for centuries accepted is no greater than the ob-
scurity of the origin of this basis of modern representative
government, adooted, along with constitutionalism itself,
in Kurooe and America, £s the foundation of all parliamen-
tary systems. In our own time when the importance of pro-
tection for minorities is being increasingly recognized,
it is a matter of sD<^cial interest to obtain clear ideas as
to the nature of the majority principle The English
conception was founded on the Teutonic theory that the forma
tion of a corporate will must always be unanimous because
the minority gives way and conforms its will to that of the
ma Jority--i .e .--all the decisions of the corporate body
are unanimous by reason of the minority giving way to the
majority. No doubt from the very first, the necessity of the
36. Governments of Europe, Munro, pp. 149, 160.
37. ibid, p. 167
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acceotr.nce of the principle of deciding by majorities was
felt instinctively; it was not till a lon^ development had
taken place, and the nation had become politically differ-
entiated that it came to be recognized that even the
majority principle depends upon certain conditions, and
that in their absence its set?ious deficiencies come to light.
Even in our own day we can find in the English parliamentary
system traces of the old conception that decisions of a
majority become, by the submission of the minority, unani-
mous declarations of the will of the House. Sir George
Cornv/all Lewis has aptly pointed out the analogy be-
tween a decision by the majority of a political body and a
battle between the armies of two independent nations: the
one is an appeal to physical force, the other is an appeal
to moral force. There must always ultimately be an element
of domination in a corporate decision which places a legal
compulsion upon the minority. It is this very ingredient
of domination in the decisions and acts of volition of
individuals, just as much as of aggregates of persons, which
converts then into specifically political acts. But one of
the chief aims of modern statesmanship is the framing of
such constitutional arrangements as will convert the nec-
essary domination as much as possible into an indirect act
of the dominated, thus molding the form of government of the
nation to a shape in which it may truly be called self-

government . "^9
Before the House meets at all, its SoeaRer is selected
by the Prime Minister after consulting with the cabinet and
with the leader of the Opoosition. As a matter of form, his
nomination is made and seconded by two private members, in
order to peroetuate the fiction that he is the choice of
the whole House and not that of the ministers. The speaker
who has served in the preceding parliament is always re-
elected, even though the ministry has changed; he is never
opposed for reelection. Because the Speaker, upon election
to that post, becomes non-part isan--a neutral in politics--
he never speaks in debate, "Even when called upon to give
the casting vote in case of a tie • , , .he breaks the tie by
voting in obedience to certain well-established principles,.,
If his negative vote would determine the defeat of a measure
while his affirmative vote would prolong its consideration,
the speaker always votes 'Aye.' If a tie comes on a pro-
posal to adjourn the debate, he always votes 'No.*"*^^
Although his rulings on points of order are final, he may
submit a question to the House and be guided by its opinion.
The House, on the other hand, may circumvent the speaker's
ruling by suspending its own rules, "Rules can be sus-
pended, amended or repealed, at any time, by a majority
vote, "40
38. Procedure in the House of Commons, Redlich, Vol, II,
pp. 261, 262, 264.
39. Governments of Europ, Munro, pp. 167-172,
40. ibid.
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In arranging its work the House of Commons always makes
the will of the majority the basis of treatment. "At the
present day this fundamental parliamentary ri-rht survives
unchallenged. The House, in theory at all events, is en-
titled to arrange its ov;n work. No other rule indeed is
possible: a parliament which accepts as binding a pro-
gramme of work imposed by some externa 1 authority, a parlia-
ment without the legal right at any moment to deliberate
upon whatever subject it desires at that moment to consider,
has ceased to deserve its name and has sunk to the level of
an administrative board. "^^
At the commencement of each daily sitting, a period
not exceeding an hour is allotted for questions, by any
member, which may be asked of a minister within whose field
of administration the matter belongs A member may not
ask more than four questions at any single sitting. Bxcept
in unusual circumstances, notice of intent to ask questions
must be duly given and the questions then appear on the
printed program of business, known as the "Orders of the
Day," a copy of which each member receives at the beginning
of the sitting. Questions must be requests for information
and must not contain and "argument, inference, imputation,
eoithet or ironical expression." If the question deals with
matters of diplomatic or domestic policy which ought to be
41, Procedure of the House of Commons, Redlich, Vol. Ill,
DP. 5, 198.
42. If the minister is a member of the House of Lords, ques-
tlons are addressed to his repre aentat ive—in the Hous e^ of—Gommorka
i.
keot confidential, the minister may refuse to answer.
Supplementary questions may be out, but no debate or dis-
cussion may follow such replies. To precipitate a discmssion
on a reply, at the close of the question period, any forty
members may rise in support of a motion to adjourn. If the
speaker accepts this motion, a debate is set for the same
evening
The rules of the House are devised to guard against
hasty and ill-considered lawmaking as v/ell as to expedite
business. No time limit on debate has been fixed by the
rules. Yet, although it is unusual for any member to/speak
for more than one hour, various devices are employed to
limit debate. '^^ Some of the outstanding methods of limiting
and curtailing debate are: (1) closure—this is the same
as moving the previous question, (2) closure by compartments-
this is an application of the orevious question to whole
groups of clauses in a proposed measure, (3) kangaroo
closure--the speaker selects amendments for discussion out
of those which appear on the order paper and passes over
the rest without discussion, and (4) time table--this assigns
specified hours to the discussion of individual clauses.
The centuries -old principle of parliamentary law that
the deliberations of the Commons are private is still
accepted as binding. Theoretically, therefore, there is no
43. Governments of Europe, Munro^ p. 172-173
44. ibid, d.199

distinction between secret and public settings and nobody
has a right to insist uoon the publicity of the debates;
all sittings are de Jure secret. "Kither the speaker or
any single member has a right to propose the exclusion of all
strangers who may be in the House, Practice, however, has
long made the nrinciole inoperfit ive . It has never been for-
mally repudiated, but since 1875 the mere fact that a mem-
ber informs the Speaker that he *espies strangers* has not
been sufficient, as it had been till then, to cause their
icmiediate expulsion and so bring about a sitting which is
secret de facto. The present regulation is that upon re-
quest of a member for the removal of strangers, a division
is to be taken at once, without debate, and the result of
the division is to determine what is to be clone. In point
of fact, nobody now dreams of avoiding publicity; on the
contrary, all the members are only too anxious that their
speeches and actions should be made known as widely as
possible."^^ The union of the Soeaker's and the Strangers'
galleries provides room for about 160 visitors. The most
regular and important visitors are the newspaper reporters
who keep the outside world informed as to what transpires
in the House of Comnons . "These private reporters alone
record what is said and done ih the House. There is not,
and never has been, an official shorthand department to take
down the speeches and debates, nor is there, strictly speak-
45, The Procedure of the House of Commons, Redlich,
Vol. II, p.28.

Ing, any official printed report of what is said, though
the House, acting by the Government^ has long assisted the
editors of Hansard's Debates by considerable subventions
from public money, and has thus, in X a c t • rendered the
continuation of this publication poss ible . ""^^
A consideration of orocedure in the English Parliament,
as in the American Congress, necessarily involves a dis-
cussion of Dolitical parties, 'i'he^division of the Commons
into two great parties manifests itself in the outv/ard
appearance of the Housej and in the arrangement of places,
party influence makes itself practically felt in the dis-
Dosal of the actual business of the House. "On all the
more important matters which have been brought forward by
the Government as the executive organ of the majority, it
has become customary for the party leaders to arrive at
some kind of understanding which forms a basis for joint
action, "as to spped or whether the measure is a party matter
and to be discussed on "party lines" or not It is one
of the incidents of parliamentary business for an official
46. ibid, pp. 29-30. On January 12,1895, the United States
Congress provided (28 Stat .603, c .23, section 13) that
"The Joint Committee on Printing shall have control of
the arrangement and style of the Congressional Record,
and while providing that it shall be substantially a
verbatim report of proceedings, shall take all needed
action for the reduction of unnecessary bulk, £.nd shall
provide for the publication of an index of the Congres-
sional Record semiuonthly during the sessions of Congress
and at the close thereof," This provision remains in
force today.
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declaration to be m&de by the leader of the Opposition as
to the attitude of his party towards the great legislative
proDOsals before the House.
Because of the iraoortance of a constant attendance of
members in numbers proportioned to the strength of the
parties, an elaborate system of party organization in the
House has been developed. Its two main features are the
"Whips" and "Pairing".
"The 7/hius are permanent honorary party officers chosen
from the members of the party itself; they hold in their
hands the entire external and internal organization and
management of the party as a oolitical parliamentary unit."^^
The Whips have the important duty of control of the arrange-
ment of "pairing," i.e., arranging for the absence of a
member from one party by a simultaneous absence of another
member from the opposite oarty, thus maintaining the relative
strength of the oarties, as far as possible, "Pairing in
the House of Commons has become a minutely regulated insti-
tution, and it is recognized as a serious failure in politi-
cal duty to go away, even for urgent private affairs, with-
out finding a pair. A breach of promise, implied by a
pair, to remain away from the House, would be so flagrant
an act of personal and political improoriety that it need
not practically be taken into account. "^^
48. ibid.
49. ibid, pp. 106-107.
50. ibid, p. 110.
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The committees in the House are chosen by a Committee
of Selection which contains eleven members named by the
House at the bep;inninf? of each session. The fact is that
membership in the Committee of Selection is arranged in ad-
vance by a conference between the prime minister and the
opposition leader. Although strict attention is not oaid
to party lines, party membership in the different committees
roughly resembles the proportionate narty strength in the
House as a whole. Proposed measures oroceed automatically
to one cf the regular committees, unless, of course, the
House votes otherwise. Unlike the committees in the American
House of Representatives, every committee in the House of
Commons must return all the bills assigned to it for con-
sideration.^^ The various types of committees in the House
are:— •
1) Standing committees on public bills; they are six
in number and have from 40 to 60 members each; they are
appointed at the opening of a session and remain unchanged
until parliament is prorogued.
2) Select committees on public bills consider individual
measures or questions which involve some new orinciple or
some subject which has not yet come before the House in the
form of a bill.
3) Sessional committees are aopointed for a single
session to deal with particular matters, such as examination
51, Governments of Europe, Munro, p. 180
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of pet it ions
.
4) Committees on Private Bills hold hearing and report
to the House which invariably pccents their recommendations,
"Party politics have no place in the consideration of pri-
vate bills. "'"^^
5) Committee of the Whole House. The Speaker appoints
a chairman to preside and then leaves the chair. The entire
House sits as a committee and an informal consideration
takes place. Upon a motion to "rise and report" the Speaker
res\ames the chair and the chairman reports the recommenda-
tions of the Committee of the V/hole House which the House
adopts
.
6) The Cabinet, though not officially so ranked, is the
greatest committee of them all. It is the steering commit-
tee •
The Crown . "Comraon law governs all that relates to the
prerogative of the Crown; its right to summon Parliament
and to summon it in the form of a proclamation, to open,
prorogue and dissolve it and to do it so either in person
or by commiss ion . "^^ "it is an integral part of the national
legislature as well. Or, as the official desighation goes,
it is one of the 'estates of the realm,' Its assent is re-
quired in the making of laws The authority of the
Crown in England is a delegated authority--de legated by
52, ibid, p. 176,
53. Law and Custom of the Constitution, Anson, p. 78.
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Darllament to a body of apients known as ministers, whose
decisions are announced in the name of the Crown.
Orders -In-council are issued by the Crown, but they have no
effect unless authorized by some act of oarliament.
When measures have been passed by parliament, royal
assent is given by certain commissioners, members of the
House of Lords, who "declare and notify his royal assent"
for the King. Royal assent is not given by merely signing
the measure. The Clerk of the Crown reads out the titles
of bills which have been passed, whereupon the Clerk of
the Parliaments solemnly pronounces a phrase in the old
French of Plantagenet days, while the lords commissioners
look on in silence. Professor Munro describes the pro-
cedure"'^^as follows: "Ordinary bills are assented to with
the words "Le Hoy le veult." Appropriation bills receive
the benediction "Le Roy remercie ses bons sujets, accepte
leur benevolence, et ainsi le veult." Private bills are
assented to with the declaration "Soit fait corame il est
desire," In the old days when the king decided to with-
hold his assent from a bill, he merely promised (like a
modern politician) that "Le Roy s'avisera." This has not
been done for more than two hundred years.
54. Governments of Kurope, Munro, pp. 44-45.
55. ibid, p. 47.
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B, The Work of Parliament
When a new parliament meets for the first time, the
members of the House of Commons must begin by electing a
soeaker. Since, by ancient tradition they cannot do this
until the lord chancellor, in the name of the crown, directs
it to be done, they follow the Gentleman Usher of the Black
Rod to the bar of the House of Lords where they stand in
silence while the lord chancellor announces "His Majesty's
pleasure that you oroceed to the choice of some discreet
and learned person to be your speaker," They return to
the House of Commons where t;ne clerk acts as temporary mentor
and they proceed to elect a speaker. The speaker and then
the members, in groups of five, take the oath of allegiance
They then go to the House of Lords where the king, or some-
one in his behalf, delivers an address (prepared by the
prime minister in consultati -n with his cabinet) commenting
on the general state of the realm, forshadowing some impor-
tant government measures and inviting the House to grant
the necessary appropriation measures. When the Commoners
return to the House, the Speech is reread by the Speaker.
The House, to demonstrate it can do business on its own
responsibility advances a dummy bill, "A Bill for the Better
Preventing of Clandestine Outlawries," through its first
56. Governments of Europe, Munro, p. 166
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stage. ^"^ The House then proceeds to debate an "address in
reply" which is merely an expression of loyalty to the cruwn
and of satisfaction with the recommendations made. A general
bombardment by the Opposition ensues.
Government Bills
. Public bills which are introduced into
Parliament by a member of the ministry are known as govern-
ment bills. Before being introduced, however, the minister
first makes a rough outline of the bill, stating only the
main principles, which he lays before the cabinet for dis-
cuss lc)n. If the principles are agreed to, he gives this out-
line to an exoert draftsman for elaboration into a finished
measure. When this is completed, the cabinet looks over the
bill, and if acceptable, it is ready to be introduced.
"The first introduction of every bill is preceded by a
notice, printed in the Orders of the Day. V/hen the time
comes, the bill is handed to the clerk of the House who reads
its title aloud. The House, without debate or discussion,
accepts this "first reading" and orders the bill to be
printed. The measure must then wait its turn. If the gov-
ernment bill is one of great imoortance, the minister in
charge may "ask leave to introduce it" at this first reading
in which case he makes an extended speech, and a general
debate may ensue, "^^
When, in due course, the bill is again reached and its
sponsor moves that it be "read a second time," there is a de-
67. It is never advanced to a second reading.
58. Governments of Kurope, Munro, p. 185.
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bate on the orlnciples of the bill which is usually followed
hy a vote determining whether the House apuroves or dis-
approves the principles of such bill. A vote adverse to the
government at this stage of the proceedings normally ex-
presses a lack of confidence in the ministry and ordinarily
compel it to resign.
If the bill successfully passes its second reading, it
enters the committee stage, Every public bill, except a
money bill, goes to a standing conimittee--in exceptional
cases the House may order it to a select committee. If the
measure is a money bill, it goes to the Committee of the
Whole House immediately after its second reading. ^iVhen this
committee debates estimates, it is said to be "in Supply";
when it is oroviding funds, it is "in Ways and Means."
It should be added that money bills must originate in the
House of Commons and may be introduced, under Rule 66, only
by a minister. Since a public bill is referred to the
committee after its second reaaing, the work of the English
Parliamentary committee differs quite considerably from
that of an American legislative committee. Having passed
its second reading, the principles of the bill have been
approved by the House of Commons and the committee now must
consider the bill as to content. In other words, the
committee does not have the oower to kill the bill or change
59, Standing Orders of House of Commons, Rule 66: "The House
will receive no petition for any sum relating to public ser-
lirice, or proceed upon any motion for a grant or change upon
public revenue, whether payable out of the consolidated fund
nr out of money to be provided by parliament, unless recom-
mended from the Crown,"
1'
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its or inciDles--it merely determines the content of the bill
to p;ive effect to those underlying princioles already approvecfl
by the Commons
,
Sooner or later, all bills must be reported back from
the coimnittees to the House, '//hen a bill is reported back,
it enters the report stage, being laid before the House in
amended and reprinted form. Amendments are debated during
this stage and alternative amendments may be offered. Ques-
tions, debated at the second reading, may be debated over
again.
"At the close of this debate, the measure is ready for
its third reading. No amendments are now in order. The
slightest change of substance or ohraseology requires the
bill be sent back to the committee. The House must now
accept or reject the bill as it stands.
"Having passed the third reading, the bill croes to the
Rouse of Lords, where the procedure is substantially the
same as in the House of Commons, for concurrence."^^
If the Lords concur, the measure is ready for the
Crown's assent If the House of Lords does not concur, the
measure may nevertheless be enacted into law if the Dro-
visions of the Parliament Act (described supra) are followed.
private Member's Bills . British parliamentary pa?ocedure
is predicated upon the theory that the initiative, as respect^
all public measures, should belong to the cabinet and that
60. cf Note 58,
61. See discussion supra under "The Crown."
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government measures ought to have the right of way. Con-
sequently, although private mo abers may introduce public
bills, they have little chance of passage or even of pro-
longed discussion. "Yet, since private members sponsor a
great many oublic bills, and as there is no chance of con-
sidering them all, the rules of the House provide that a
selection from the entire grist shall be made by lot. At an
apDOinted hour, tnerefore, those private members who desire
to introduce public bills are requested to put their cards in
a box at the clerk's table, and the clerk draws them out one
by one. The member whose name is first drawn gets the oppor-
tunity to introduce his bill on the first Friday of the
session; the second member gets the second Friday, and so on
till the Fridays of the session are exhausted—t"welve or fif-
teen of them in all." The bills so chosen go on the
respective Orders of the Day and follow the same procedure
as other public bills.
Private Bills . "A private bill.,,, is one which relates
to the interest of some one locality, or corporation, munici-
pality or other particular person or body of persons. "^'^ A
private bill takes the form of a petition with the bill
annexed. First it must go before two parliamentary officials
(one from each House) known as the Examiners of Petitions for
private Bills, who examine to see whether there has been a
full compliance with the requirements, i.e., that the petitioj.
was preceded by certain published notices, as provided, in
fi2. Governments of Europe ^ Munro . pp. 187-188 65 . Ibid.p_^184
• -t • •
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order to inform such interests as may be affected by the bill,
and, that copies were sent to such governmental departments
as may be concerned. "if the i!.xaminers so certify, the bill
may then be presented to either House, where it is custom-
arily referred to a committee on unopposed bi^ls. If there
is opposition, the bill goes to one of the private committees
which conducts hearings and reports back to the House, favor-
ably or unfavorably, with or without amendments. Such com-
mittee's report on the bill is almost invariably accepted. "^^
Since both the Lords and the Commons are prorogued to-
gether, and since prorogation terminates all penaing busi-
ness, any "measure which has not been finally passed by
both Houses at the date of prorogation must be introduced
anew at the next sedsion and must go through all its stages
over again to become a law."^^
Provisional Orders. "The quest for private or special
acts has been considerably slackened by the use of "orders"
issued by a central department and becoming effective either
automatically or when confirmed by parliament in which case
they are known as "provisional orders." The usual practice
is to lump several provisional orders into a confirmation
bill and enact them into law."^^
Control of the Purse. Parliament is something more
than a machine to make laws, or a debating society; it con-
trols the purse and it may redress grievances. Since the
cabinet is the real power active in Parliament, it controls
64. ibid, p. 188; 65. ibid, p. 181; 66. ibid, p. 192.
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the Durse. Of course, the members of the House of Commons
have an opportunity to deliberate on some items of the bud-
get, but by no means on the majority of such items. The
items which they discuss are thoughtfully and duly considered,
But then the end of the session approaches, and the budget
must be passed. "in one crowded hour of glorious life, on
a hot August night, the estimates of all the departments
which have not previously been passed, are out specifically
one after another from the chair, and the Committee and the
House are asked to approve or disapprove without a word of
discussion. "^'^ Thus, it may truly be said that the Cabinet,
through Parliament, conti'ols the purse.
Redress of Grievances . Through the elected reoresenta-
tives of the people, they control the machine, called the
Executive, which governs them. Any or every one of its acts
may be challenged, approved or condemned; if condemned by
the Commons, it has to be changed. "Kvery grievance of
every citizen, however humble, in which the central govern-
ment may be directly or indirectly concerned, may be brought
for redress before the House of Commons to be justified or
remedied by the responsible Minister in that Assembly."
Attention to grievances may be called, in the Question Per-
iod, through questions and supplementary questions. Fur-
ther, "any member of parliament may have printed on the
67. How England is Governed, C .F.G .Masterman, p. 235.
68. ibid, p.214
69. ibid, p. 215
i
order oaoer a notice that he proposes to call attention to
some matter of grievance or criticism, and to move a reso-
lution. The resolution will be in practice a vote of cen-
sure. He may even, as some members have done, put down a
motion attacking; a ruling of the Speaker himself, or the
Chairman of Committees, when he thinks either of these have
given unfair decisions. Unfortunately for the private mem-
ber the Government has control over the time of the
House If, however, the leader of the Opposition in
the past, or one of the leaders of the Opposition in the
future, asks for a day to propose a formal vote of censure
on uhe Government, or on some important policy it has
adopted, that authoritative challenge to its continued
support by a majority of the House is invariably accepted,
and a debate takes place full of passion and bitterness . ""^^
Another opportunity for expressing grievances comes in
the discussion of appropriations for the several departments
of the Government. Members of the House have an opportunity
to attack suspected delinquencies in a department either
throup:h the committee or when the committee reports to the
House. "The common form is to propose that the salary of
the Minister responsible be reduced by, say, 50 pounds
If the motion is carried, the unfortunate minister does not
lose 50 pounds of his salary. He loses all his salary and
70. ibid, p. 225.
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his colleagues also. For, unless they attempt to reverse
what they may interoret as a snap vote, unrepresentative of
the real opinion of the House, they must resign. And in
any case a succession of such snap votes would ensure their
71
res ignat ion.
"
71. ibid, p. 226.
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SUMMARY
.
Before summarizing and interpreting the differences
that have been evolved in orocedures developed in Great
Britain and United States of America for defining, deter-
mining, expressing and executing sovereign will, these
further observations are to be made: —
1) Both nations have been confronted with similar
problems
;
2) Each has sought to achieve the same end as the
other;
3) In each the same fundamental assumptions have been
made as guides to political reasoning.
Similarity of Assumptions which underly the forms of
Procedures .
1) Sovereignty rests in the whole nation.
2) A determination of the sovereign will can be had
only by means of a procedure in which alternatives are
presented for adoption or rejection.
3) For the purpose of choosing between alternatives
presented, the whole people will adopt as their will the
decision reached by a majority.
4) The unanimity of will derived from the adoption of
the majority principle is to be extended to that of un-
animity of action and on this basis the nation will proceed
•<
1
i
to test the soundness of its decisions.
5) The representatives, as a body, constitute a court
of first instance for matters of public policy in which
the same procedure, essentially, is adhered to as in the
law courts.
6) The members of the electorate, as a court of appeal
from the representative body, are the final arbiters in
matters of public policy.
In each nation the same principle is applied for deter
mining qualifications of voters . The electorate is composed
of that portion of the citizenry which is deemed to possess
such qualifications as to assure the exercise of mature and
sane discretion in practical matters based on experience,
and to voice the will of the people.
political parties have the function of translating
Public Opinion, as determined by the vote of the electorate
in the choice of issues presented, into governmental action.
Thus, in both England and America, when the dominant party
has a clear majority, it controls the House and may carry
through its platform, even though a majority in the House
of Representatives has not as much authority as the majority
in the House of Commons
.
Although there is no unanimity of opinion as to the
exact role of a representative, i.e., whether he is meant
to be a free agent or a mere servant obeying the "mandate
4I
iraperatif," the appearance of such phenomena as instruc-
tions, pledges, censure and recall are indeed significant.
Both governments provide for the redress of grievances
In America, the Bill of Rights provides for such redress
through petition; private bills are also used for this pur-
pose. The English do this by means of questions in the
Question Period, by resolution for a vote of censure, and
by private bills.
The referendum, which is well-known in the United
States, is not used in England, Thus, the American elector
ate may enact or prevent legislation in spite of the will
of Congress, This power the English electors te does not
possess. Yet, it should be remembered in this connection
that when the American Congress is elected it remains in
office for its full term without regard as to whether the
largest party can or cannot carry out its program. When
an English parliament is elected, on the other hand, it
may be dissolved at any time after it is convened if the
largest party in office cannot maintain the confidence of
the House, i.e., carry out its program.
The English Parliament has a greater responsibility,
and therefore, more power, than the American Congress, The
latter is only one of three coordinated branches of govern-
ment, the executive and judiciary being separate and inde-
pendent. Parliament contains within its organization the
— 4
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judiciary and the executive and thus must not only deter-
mine and express sovereign will, but must also execute it,
Examinin^T the structure of the legislative bodies in
both countries, we note that they are bicameral. The mem-
bers in the lower House of each country are elected directly
by the people; the basis of representation is population.
The Speaker in the House of Representatives is a party man
and exercises his partisanship in the conduct of the Hoiase's
business while the Speaker in the House of Commons is non-»
partisan and remains neutral during his incumbency in that
office
.
The prime minister, a party leader, is chosen, in real-
ity, by the party caucus. The position in the House of
Representatives which most nearly resembles this office is
that of the majority floor leader. Both Houses have similar
committee systems . The committee members are all chosen
along partisan lines outside of the Houses by party members;
the composition of each committee is then approved by the
party caucuses, also outside the Houses, and are then sub-
mitted to the Houses for formal ratification. The theory
followed throughout is that the dominant political party,
through its majority, is responsible for fulfillment of its
program. The committees in the House of Representatives are
more important than those in the House of Commons
. So imp-
ortant, in fact, are these House committees that they have

been dubbed "little legislatures," Before any bill is dis-
cussed in the House of Representatives, it goes to some
committee which has the power, virtually, of life or death
over such bill. In the House of Commons, on the other
hand, a bill goes to a committee only after it has passed its
second reading, i,e,, after the principles of the bill have
been approved by the House; it is then the committee's func-
tion to matce adequate, legal expression of the principles
approved and report the bill back to the Commons. A commit-
tee in the House of Representatives, on the other hand, may
"pigeon-hole" a bill and it will thus never come to a con-
sideration by the whole House.
Representation in the United States Senate is on a basis
of states (i.e., each stats Its two Senators regardless of
population) and the parties function through the committee
system in much the same way as they do in the House of Rep-
resentatives. Since membership in the House of Lords deoends
on social, financial or educational status, and since member-
ship in this body is for life, political parties play a
relatively insignificant role in its activities. The Lords
have no standing committees. The Vice-President's position
in the Senate, like the lord chancellor's position in the
House of Lords, is more like that of a moderator than a
presiding officer. In both these bodies there are compara-
tively few rules of procedure and debate is practically un-

limited because political parties have less influence here
than in the lower Houses,
To be enacted into law, bills must go through approx-
imately the same procedure in Congress as they do in Parlia-
ment. In the lower Houses they must pass three readings,
be considered in committee, debated in the House and sent
on to the second chambers where they must survive a similar
procedure; finally, they must be approved by the executive.
There are, however, some important differences in the pro-
cedure. As has been shown, American committees have more
power than English committees. Further, the American Con-
gress makes no distinction, as do the English between pub-
lic, orivate and money bills. A presidential veto can kill
a bill unless two-thirds of the House and Senate respectively
override the veto. The withholding of assent by the Crown
in unimaginable. Let us now turn our attention to certain
dissimilarities of major importance which have developed.
Dissimilarities that have developed in the application of
the underlying assumptions and procedures
.
1) In the House of Commons, the English court of first
instance for matters of public policy, every question of
public policy is heard by the court as a whole; opportunity
is given to all interested parties, through their repre-
sentatives, who are members of the House, to present evidena©
for or against tho proposal; each side is permitted to

address the House as a whole (i.e., tne entire court) and
present the merits of its case in the beat light; the House
as a whole hears and considers the evidence and deliberates
the merits and defects of the proposition; the entire House,
presided over by an impartial moderator, then determines,
on the basis of the majority principle, whether to act
favorably or unfavorably on the proposed plan; then--and
then only--after approval by the entire court of the plan,
it is sent to a committee for detailed study and further
elaboration after which the committee must report back to
the entire court for its final determination.
In the House of Representatives, the nominal American
court of first instance for matters of public policy, every
question of public policy is immediately referred to a
partisan committee for its consideration. Pressure of busi-
ness is the reason ^iven for such routine practice. If the
particular committee regards the proposal unfavorably, for
any reason whatsoever, it kills the plan and the "American
court of first instance" never even hears about it--let
alone consider it. This is the fate of the far greater
majority of measures introduced in the American Congress.
The only measures which ever reach the House of Representa-
tives for its attention are those which are referred to it
by the several "little legislatures" at the direction of
external influences.

Thus, we find that although the formal procedures in
England and America are essentially alike, the English have
applied the spirit to tbe letter of the law while the Amer-
icans have done everything but that. The divorce, by the
Americans, of the spirit from the letter of the law has re-
sulted in the creation of two classes of pet it ioners--that
privileged class which can get its case heard before the
court of first instance and that large, ordinary, usual class
which has to be content with a determination of its griev-
ances by a partial agency of such court.
2) Another practical dissimilarity arises in the matter
of appeal and review. When the English lower house sits as
a court of first instance, the particular situation is so
dramatized that the proponents of a measure, in the ewent
of unfavorable action taken upon the bill, or its opponents,
in case of such favorable action, may have a direct and
immediate appeal to the people squarely on the issue, through
a dissolution of the House. In America, such machinery does
not exist. Even when a measure does receive a hearing by
the American House of Representatives, the parties dis-
satisfied with its decision can do nothing else than wait
for the expiration of the term of the legislature before
they can appeal to the people. By that time there is such
an accumulation of issues to be decided by the single vote
of the electorate that, discarding all external influences.

a satisfactory solution to any one problem is a practical
impossibility
.
It has been suggested that the election of a President
of the United States entails a definition of issues and an
expression of sovereign will on such issues. Is this the
case? It seems clear that the party platform on which a
presidential candidate is elected usually contains so many
issues, when indeed it is not so obscure and vague as to
defy intelligent interpretation altogether, that it seems
hardly fair to assert that the candidate's election repre-
sents an expression of aporoval of sovereign will on all
issues mentioned in the platform. And is it not as logical
to assume that a particular candidate was chosen because
his platform was less distasteful to the electorate than
his opponent's? If there did, in fact, occur such a nega-
tive expression of sovereign will, what affirmative action
is the new president to take? Further, when a President is
reelected, such reelection is in the nature of a referendum
whereby the electorate voices sovereign approval of acts
already performed--but there is no true expression as to
what constitutes the sovereign will on acts to be performed.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt was reelected. Was there
any expression of sovereign will on the question of in-
creasing the United States Supreme Court personnel? By
his reelection, did the sovereign will express satisfaction

at the President's failure to do anything when the New
Deal was invalidated? One guess may be more reasonable
than another--but it is only a guess. If the election of
a United States President is an expression of sovereign
will, the nature of the expression is such that it requires
particular analysis and definition before it can be
accurately ascertained, perhaps the President himself ought,
to interpret what was meant by the contents of the party
platforms
.
In the matter of executive determination and expression
of sovereign will, it is well to indicate a point of analogy
between a Presidential proclamation and an order- in-Counc il
as issued by the Crown.
Finally, it should be not 3d, that in America the nation^
al legislature has formally provided for publicity and per-
manent record of its proceedings through the Congressional
Record. The English Parliament has never made such formal
provision, though the government has subverted some funds,
from time to time, to assist in the maintenance of Han-
sard's Debates.
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